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• PREFACE 
In vi ew of the unsettled oontl~ t ion of European diplomacy ~ 
today, it should be profitable to stutl.y the antecedents of the 
World War j n more det ail than h ~ therto. Suoh a study will make 
olearer the steps taken by national leaders then - steps whi oh 
at that time were unable to avold war. 
Many Europeen statesmen who were in power before thp. World 
War have been regarded by some authors as ha~ ng har. some degree 
of responsibility for that oonfliot - and Prestdent l'oinca~e of 
France was no exception. The reoent publl oati on of the Docu­
ment s Diplomat1 ques Fran%ai s has prov!. iI.ed adilt ti onal inform"ltJ.on, 
as have other late publlcations on the World War. It is my pur­
pose in tM s thes1 s to investigate the part played by Preel ilent 
POinoare during the days between June 28 end August 4, 1914, a!rl 
to determlne, as far as posslble, whether there ~s any justifica­
tion for oharges of responsibillty made against him by oertain 
writers, some of whom have been trylng to clear thelr own country 
of the blame for starting the World War as set forth in the so-
called "war gu!.lt" clauss, Article 231, of the Treaty of Versa111es 
of 1919. 
.. 
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/RAYM01\]) 	 POI l\ CARE'S ROLE IN TEE NEGOTIATIONS 

FROt: JUNE 28 to AUGUST 4, 1914 

CHAPTER 	 I " 
IRTRODUCTION 
• 
R~'l!1ond Po'ncare was born, August l'O, 1860, at Bar-If'!-duc, 
in the department of Meuse - wh! ch had formerly been a part of 
the province of 10rra! np.. He wap tr, e son of f, l colas Po:; ncare, 
who was a c'v!l servant and rneteorolog1 st. R~'mond Poir,care Waf' 
educated at the Uni versi ty of Par; s anc. was called to thp. bar j n 
Paris. He was also the editor of Voltaire, end j.n 1909 he became 
a member of thp. French Aoademy. 
Thepo11 t1 cal posts held by Raymond Po l.ncare werp. many. In 
188'7 he was elected deputy for t.he ~'eusp.. In 1893 he entered the 
M;nistry as Vin!ster of EducatIon. TIe was a moderate republican. 
In the following year he became Mi I'i ster of Finance, and he shoYl­
ed great abilHy In the me;tters of natIonal financfl 
~ 
and the budget. 
In the late 1890' s he was V! ce Presl dent of the Chamber of ])ep"ti es. 
Apart from fi nance, hi s !.nterests were 'n -foreign affairs. He was 
, 
an intense nationalist. From January', 1912, to 1913, he was Premier, 
or Pre 81 dent of the Council of Mi.n!. st ers, and hel d the portfol! 0 
of Min! ster of Foreien Aff'l.irs. l In Y.ovembe:r', 1912, m .th ll. Po'n­
c .are 
/ 
I s approval, the Grey-Cambon letters conoern; ng pOBa i ble future 
naval cooperation between England and France in the event of a war 
2
"ere exchanged. . He W!la elected President of the Frenoh Repub110 
on January 17, 1913. Dur!ne the t17ing days whi oh feillowed, it 

.* 

1. Bemus, Pierre, article in Enc~'clopaedia Britannica, XVIII, 
2. ~'erri01rs of Raymond Po! ncar~, I, 113-5; 
cf., Grey, Twenty-five Years, I, 94-6. 
115-6. 
~ 
, 
was fortunate for France that her pres1dent was a strong rather 
than a weak personality.l 
When Raymond Poincare, then Premier, was elected President 
on January 17, 1913, ~. t took two ballot s by the National Assembly 
to obtain the requir~ absolute majority for election. Thus, 
even in the Parliament of Francs, opinion was div~ded.2 He 
. received messages of oongratulations from the other states. A 
fOrrrler Berlin newspaper ed~ tor says tt.at President Po1.ncare 
exaggerated when he decided that these tel~rams were~videnoe 
that nall Europe saw in the vote of the National Assembly a 
happy pledge of peace. n3 M. IevolBky, the Russian Ambassador 
~ 
in Paris, wrote on the day before the election .of Pres~dent Po~n-
car~, "Tomorrow. • are the Prss1denti.al elections • God grant 
that POi ncare may not be beaten. I t will be a o'atastrophe for 
us. n4 Y. Isvolsky felt that he could influence PresIdent P01n­
/' 
care to b/:'! favorable to RUSSI a and unfavorahle to Germany and 
Austria-Hungary. 
In June, 1914, President Po~. noar~ asked M. V~v1an1 to form 
a ministry. This was rather difficult because some of M. Viv1ani 'I!' 
colleagues oppose" the three-year milHary serv1 ce law whi ch had 
been restored 1.n 1913 and whi oh was favored by the President. 
After one unsuccessful attempt, M. V1 v1 ani, agree:rng to pem1t . the 
three-year military service law to rem.ain in effeot until an ade­
quate subst1tute could be devised, was given a vote of oonf1dence 
1. Munro, Governments ot Europe, 425. 
2. Ibid., 420. -
3. Wolft, The Eve ot t914, 271. 
4. DickinsOn, WernaTIOii'al Anarchy, 322. 
.... 5 
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/ 
on June 16. l 'hus the stage was set for the ACti on of 1914.1 
l'hat action was ,begun, not In France, but ln Austr1 a-Hungary • 
•On June 28, 1914, occurred the assass1nation whlhh set ~n 
motion the cl!a1 n of eTents WhlCh w"re to lead d1rectly to the " 
beg~nn1nB of the World War. On that day Archduke FrqncJ s Ferdl­
nand, he1 r to the Emperor of Austria, and hIs wife, the DucheR8 
of Hohenberg, were vj s1t~nB in Jlosnl.a, wh1 ch was then Austrian 
ter:r:itory. l'hey were on an official V1 S1.t 1n the town of Sara­
jevo to witr.ess the army maneuvers. Two attempts were made by 
Bosnlan subjects to assasslne.te the Archduke and Ms w1fe; the 
second attempt, by Gavrilo Princlp, a Bosn1 an Bubject, was S'lccess­
ful. 2 
On June 28, President Po:!.ncare was at· Longchamps for the 
Grand Prl.x when he was !nformed by telegram of the assass1rat:!on. 
After returning to the f~Y8ee, he sent h1 8 condolences to the 
Emperor Franr;is Joseph, for whtch the Emperor later thanked Mm. 3 
On the same day M. V1 viani, Pres1 dent of the Council of M~ ni at ers 
and ylnister of Foreign Affairs, Bent condolences through Ambassa­
dol' Duma;ne, the French Ambassador in Vlenna, to the Emperor. 
VeuHlez atre I!Upr~s de Gouvernernent imp~rie1 
et' rOyal l'interpr~te des plus ' sinc~ref!condoleances 
du Gouvernernel't de la Republi que a 1 nst que des 
sentiments d'horreur que lui infp~re 1 'attentat 
dont ont ete vl. ctl.mes a Serajevo Son Altesse imper:! ale 
l'Arch~duc hertHer et Madame la duchesse de Hohenberg. 4 
/ 
On the following day M. Dumaine reported to the Foreign Office. 
Apr~sm'aToir assure de 8a grat!tuGe pour 
~'e~reRB1on dea profondea condol~ances du Uouven5e­
ment de 1 a Repub11QUe, dont Votre Excellence m'aTa1t 
I. 
1. Ifemoi ra ~ RaY!lonlf"Poincarf!, II. 135. 
2. Documents D1p1omat1ques Fran~a18 • X, 646. 
3. Memoirs ot-RaYmond .Poincar€. II, 142. 
4. Documents Dip1omatiques ' Fran'jais, X, 64fi. ' 
677. 
-­
6 
charge de me fa1re l'tnterprete aupr~s de lu', le 

comte Berchtold m'a yarle avec une sincere ~~9ti on 

de sa longue int1rnite avec l'Archidua defunt.~ 

'-. 
The French attitude In resl'ect tG the assaBs1nat~ on was 
reserved and correct; and when the Austro-Rungar1an Ambassador 
came to thank h 1.m for h1 s condolences, Pres\dent Po'ncart! sa1 d 
he 	was convinced that "the Serbi an Government would show the , 
Monarchy the greatest complaisance 1n the Jud 1 cial investigation 
and the prosecut1on of the aCcOml'lices~2 
The French, knowing nothing of the events that took l'lace 
in 	Vi enna following the assass1nation, oontinued much as usual. 
~n 	July 8, Ambassador Dumaine reported that he thought that the 
Austr1an rn11itary l'arty would be unable to force upon Serh1 a an 
inquiry about tIE orime, and that the Emperor, Franc's Joseph, 
3
would prevent any d1 splay of threats. · A similar report was 
, 
4
recei ved on July 10, from the same source. Pre sident Po' nc !Ire 
wrote concerni ng the sItuation in PaM s: 
• • •• In Pari s we suspect noth' ng of. all 

this, the Austr1 an Sphinx 1. s impenetrable. In 

all thi s mystery 1 could not gjve up my impend1.ng 

Journey to the North o~ Europe, for which every­

thing had been arranged; moreov.er, a sudden 

change of l'lan might h ave suggested ' some impend­

ing danger ·and might have scared Europe.5 

On 	 the 13th of July, the Prince of Monaco, who hall been on a 
~ 
v'sit to Kiel, stopped to v1s i t the PresIdent at the Elysee 
·and to Apeak of the governIng abil i ty of the Kaiser. 6 On 
1. 	Documents D1 plomatiques FranCai s, l, 6'54. 
2. 	iemoirs of RaYmond POinoare,:lI, 142. 
3. 	K~oirs il Ra~nd Polnoar6, II, L56; 

of., DQoiiiient~1p1omat1. qU88 Franfais. X, 692. 

4. 	Memoirs ot Ra -nd Pol.ncari, II, 59; 

of., DooUiien s omat! ues Franl8iS, X, 707. 

5. 	Memoirs of Ralmond oincar ,11, 60. 
6. 	Ibid., 160". 
7 
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lJuly 14, France peacefully celebrated her nati o!' al fet e. 
Dur1ng this time plans for the v1sit to Russia were being made; 
•the Ambassadors corresponded about the speeches to be made by 
. 2 Pres~. dent Poincarll and the' Tear. :­
.. 
•1.Vemoi rs of Raymonl·Poinoar~ .. 11, 161. 
2.Documents Diplomat3ques Franga~s, X, 706-64. 
e 
CHAPTER II 
,0 
POINCARE'S VISIT TO RUSSI! 
In order to strengthE'-l1 the Franco-Russian all~ance, the 
~ 
Grand Duke N1 cholas N1.cole.i ev1 tch had prevlouely vi s~ ted Par1 s,l 
and plans had been made for Presi dent Po<ncare. accompan l ed. by 
Prem1erVlviani, to ·Vls~t st. Petersburg. Because of delay· ~n 
Parliament, they were unable to reach Dunki rk unt i l the 15th of 
July. lhere they embarked on the battlesh< p France, w~ th the 
~ Bart as her companion. 2 
Concern'ng the plans for the v' s f t and the lack of records 
concerning the conversat<ons which took place 'n St.Petersburg 
during t he vl si t of President Poin care and Prem<er Vl vi an~, the 
editorsof the Documents liiplomatI9.Ues Fran~a1s sai d in the Avant­
Propo s: 
'" / I .L'~utre evenemeJ'lt est la v<site du Pre s tdent 
de la Republique, Jl . Poincare, et du Pr'es~. dent du 
Conseil, M. Viviani, ~ Salrt-P~tersbourg, du 20 au 
23 Juillet. Cette vI site e.vait &ttli prevue des le 
mois de Janvi er; mals el1e revetalt, dans lesclr­
oonstanoes ou elle se' produisait, une importanoe 
toute partiouli~re. La Comrnl ssion e. fait, M.en 
entendu, toutes les recherches poss<.bles pour 
essayer de retrouver un compte rendu de ces conver­
o" /
sationE de Sa<n t -Petersbourg, dont M. Po i ncare a 
donne, on le sait, un r~cjt d~tallle dans ses 
. souvenIrs. Ces recherches ont ete presque entiere­

ment vaines, comme paralssent d'ailleurs l'avoir 

et~ oelles qui ont &te faites par les ~dit~urs de 

doouments rUBses. Dans les aroh i ves des Mfai.res 

~trangeres, ou l'on trouve un dossier sur la 

pr~paration de 1a visite. 11 n'ex1ste qu'une seule 

note,tr~. breve, -de 1a me.tn de M. Vtv1ani, ­
•1. Memoirs of R~mon4 POinoare, I, 253. 
2. Ibid., II, 1 . 
9 

--. 

qui para~ sse se rapporter aux entret~ens. Les 
t~legrammes eohan~es entre Sa~nt-PetersbourB et 
Paris pendant 1.:a v~ s~te concernent untquel'lent la 
politlque ~nter~eure fran9alee. Dans les aroh~ves 
de la Pr~s~denoe de la R~publ~~ue, aucnne ~nd~oa­ :.tion n'a ~te retouv~e. Les aroh~ves de l'ambass­
ade de Franoe ~ Sa~ nt-P~tersbourg, qu~ ·ont -ete 
ramen~!Sa ii. Par; 8, ne donnent auoun n!nse ignement. • 
~es efforts qul ont ete faits pour reouell1er dss 
pap~. ers pr~v~s ont eu le meme resultat negatl f: • 
lss paplers o.e M. Po~noar~, tous deposes auJourd' 
hui dane les arohlves du Quai d'Orsay. ne oont~en­
nent auoune · pi~ce pour cetta per~oc1e; c'est en 
valn que la C01"'l'l1 ssion a essaye de trouver (les 
pall~ ers de M,Viv~anl, s'll en exi ste •. , • 
}al~ologue, ambassadeur de France A Sa! nt .-peterfl­
bourg, qui a deja publ~' sss souv~nlrs sous forme 
de Journal, a fai t savo'r qU' ~ 1 ne 0 oneervai t danr 
ses papiers personnels aucun dooument a oe suJet. 
Beoause of the silenoe of the Doouments DlplomatIques Fran)a!s 
on the vis~t to Russia, it has been neoessary to seek information 
elsel!lhere. Nevertheless, such a silenoe makes one wonder I.f It 
is :possIble that sOl!le one may have removed part of the fIles be­
fore the COl!lm~ ssion began Its work. :t'resldent Polnoar~ has made 
very few notes on the results ot' agreements reaohed by th~ s vi sIt. 
The PresIdent and the Premier of Franoe bad planned to v~slt 
RUSSI a in aooordanoe with the cWltom of Franoe Ill1d Russ~. a to ex­
change rt'lcl.prooal vIsits since the.v had made their all! ance i.n 
1894. PresIdent Poinoare had p r eviouely vIsIted Russia in 1912, 
then as Prem l er. 2 
Sinoe preparations for this visit of state had been made so 
far in advance ano. events had been planned aocordingly, l.t was 
im:possible to llost:pone the visit. When·it was BUg6.estec). to 101. 
Viviani that he postpone the v i sit because of !nternBl happenings 
jn Franoe he wrot e. on June 22~ to ~h e Charg' d r Arf 11.1 re s at St • 
• • 
1. Documents D1plomatiques Fran<fa~s, X, 
2. Ibid., 165. . 
vi-vn. 
.., 10 
Petersburg that he had been informed that certain engagements 
of the Tsar prev;ented such a change. l After the assass~ nation 
in Sarajevo, Austria' seemed to be rather calm. Furthermore, it 
was felt that I, f Pre S1 dent PoI ncar~ canoelled h~ s voyage to Russia ~'. 
at that tlme it might tend to aggravate an already grave diplomatJc 
situation. .. 
M. Sazonov, then the Russ~an M1n1,ster for Fore~gn Affairs, 
wrote about the Russian opinion of President Poincarl!. 
At the beg'nning of January, 1913, the French 
Prime Mintster and Minister for Forel gn Affairs, U. 
POincare, was elected President of the French Republic 
in succession to M. Fall~~res - a oho1ce WhiCh was 
hal led with sat1 stactl on In Russl a. At the suggestlon 
of our , AJolbassador in Pari s, M. I svolsky, whl ch recel,ved 
my support, the Emperor conferred the Order of st. 
Andrew upon the new President as soon as he had taken 
up his duties. This was a departure from the usual 
custom of granting the hl ghest decoration of the 
Emp~re to the head of a State only after he had 
occupled the pOSition for SOMe t~me; except~ons were 
made only on some spectal oC'caslon, such as a personal 
meeting. 
M. Polncare's v ' sit to St. Petersburg in 1912, 

had left a good 1mpresslon. We apprecIated hls 

peaceful d1sposltion and hls loyalty to the alllance, 

no less than his flrmness and tenaclty of purpose; 

this last 1s a quality most valuable J,n a statesman, 

even ,when ~t verges on .the corresponding defect­

obstinacy. , 

The Russl. ans fel t that Presid,ent Poinoarll would be pro-Russi an. 
The France, oarryl ng Pre s1 dent POl nc are and Preml er Vlvl anl 
arrived at Cronstadt on the afternoon of July 20. They were 
./ 
escorted by Admiral Gregorovl tch to the ImperIal yacht where 
they met Tsar Nlcholas. 3 The two rulers, the Tsar and the 
Pres",dent, d1 scussed pleasantly the l r previ oue nieetl ngs, and oon­
versed lna lively manner . Conoern~ng tha.t di ecusston., Ambaslla­
1. Documentll .Diplomat•1 quell' FrangaJlI, X, S03-4.. :-., 
2. SazonoT, FatetUl Yearll,149. 
3. Yemoirs ot RaYmond POincare, II, 165. 
-. 11 

dor Pal~ologue, who was also on the yacht at that · time, wrot e: 
As was proper 1 t was Pol ncare who haa the 

in~tlat~ve.' Before long f.!l was ~oing all t.he 

talk~ng. The T$ar simply nodded aoquiesoence, 

but hJ s whole appearance showed hi. s sincere 

approval. It radl ated oonfl dence ancleympathy.l 

-. 
The GermsnAmbassadoT was un~mpressed by Polncare's arr~val 
in Russ~ a. Ambassador Pourtales reported, on July 23, that 
•
Pres! dent 1'0incare recejved a "coolreceptl on", but he attr~ but­
ed part of the "great apathy of the gel' eral publl c" to the work­
ingmen's str~kes, wh~ch, in addltlon to ot.her lnconveniences, 
prevented some .of the newspapers from being publi shed. 2 On the 
following day he again reported to Berlin: 
• • • • For the arrl val of the Pre s~ dent and 
for hi s passage along the Neva Quay to the W~nter 
Palace, but a oomparatively small proportion of the 
phhli 0 gad gathered, wh~ ch not only faUed to gj ve V.l'. 
Polncare an ovation, but, indeed scarcely greeted him. 
The streets -. (lecorated by pol~ ce orders, but 1 n no 
wfIY part~ cularly thl. ckly beflagged - through wh~ ch the 
Presldent w~th hls escort and a numerous su'te passed 
on a dr~ve about the c~ty during the afternoon, were 
far from being unusually l~vely, and only at the streAt 
corners d~d a few curious s~ght-seers gather to await 
the passing of the cort~ge. 
On July 20, the Tsar gave a banquet in honor of h~ s guests 
from France. At this banquet the Tsar and Pres~de!1t POir;care 
made speeche s concernl ng the all ~ anoe and .trl el'dshl p of the two 
countries.4 These same speeches hacl b'len the subjAct of several 
tel egrams between Premi er v~ v~anl and Ambassacl,91' ]?al-eologue 1 n 
st. Petersburg durlng the early part of July. The Doouments Dlplo­
mati ques Franpaie give the 1'ull text of President Polncare's speech, 
but onll the suggested modif~ cati ons 1'or the Tear's SIl;,ech, wh~ ch 
1. P81eologue, An Ambassador's Memoirs, I, 13. 

2 • Kaut sky, ClutliTeak _f the World War, 168. 

3. Ibid., 211. - -- -­
4. Pal flologue , An Ambassador's l~emoirs, I, 14. 
12
'" 
were accepted by }I. Sazonov.l In this Manner the stage for 
the d~. nner was set. so that the speeches would he accaptable 
to both of the count;rl.es concerned. The text of the Tsar'·s 
speech ~s g~ven in the publ~cation of the 1"923 volume of the 
H~stortoal lournal of ·the Russ~an Sovl.et Government. Concern­
~ng the alltance, the Tsar sajd: 
•
• • • . Uri~ted s'nce .long ago by the mutual 

sympathy of thp.'r peoples and the~ r common 

~nterests, France and Russ'a have reen closely 

bound together dur~ng nearly a quartp.r of a 

century w'th the object of better pursu~ ng one 

. and the same aim, wh'ch cons'sts ~n ma1ntaln~ng 

these inte:r:-ests by co-operat~.ng 1n the preserva­

t~on of the balance amI the peace of Europe. I 

do not doubt that both of our countrIes, true to 

the'r peaceful ~deals and relyIng upon the!r 

proved all! ance as also upon the'r oommon frlend­

"hips, wHl cont!.l'ue to enjoy the henefits of the 

reaoe wh! ch the f'ullness of the! r strength ensures 

by constant2y tyIng more tightly the bands wMch 
unj te them. . . 

In Pres~dent Po~ncare's sjJeech weTe the follow1ng statements: 
"Pres de vlngt-cing 8l".s ont passe depu; s que, 

dans une cla're v' sIon v.e leur destin, nos pays 

Ol't un' les efforts de leur d~plQmatje. et les 

heureux r~sultats · de cette assoc~ atl on peI'l!la­
nente se font taus les jours sent ' r oans l'equ~llbre 

. du monde. 
n ••••1' alliance, dont l' ~ llUfltre Empereur 

Alexandre III et leregrett~ Pres; dent Carnot ont 

pr's la premlere 1n't'at<ve, a constamment donne', 

depu~ s lors, la preuve de son action b'enfa~ sante 

'!t. (Ie son 'rebranlable soUdj te. 

"Yotre raj este pent etre assuree que, deJT1a1 n 
comme hler, la France poursu'vra dans une collabo­
ration Intime et quotld1 enne avec son alli-ee 
l'oeuvre de pajx et de c'v~l'sation a lequelle /' 
les deux Gouvernements et les deux nat~ons 
n'ont cess~ de travalller •. ' . ' .n3 
~ . 
According to Ambassador Paleologue, . the Pres1dent's speech 
1. Doouments l)jplomatl.ques Franva1. '" X, 706-S". 
2. How the War Bigan 113. 
3. D<iOumentSDiP OJlla~qUe8 Fran".'''.' X, '155. 
13 
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was well rec~ived. AfterwarQs the Tsar held a lev~e at whIch 
everyone seemed' ,anx:\ous to meet Presldent po~ncar~.l
• 
Another tmportant event durIng the Presl dent's VI 51 t to st. 
Pet ersburg was the d! plomati c receptlon gi yen 1 n h;, s honor at 
the Wlnter l:'alace on the afternoon of July 21. There he spoke 
to the German Ambassador, Count Pourtales, hut the su~ject of' 
poll t~ cs was not ment1oned. 2 Dur~ng thl8 1ntervlew occurred 
the dJscussion between Pree~dent Po~ncare and Count Szapary, the 
Austri an AMbassador.:3 Pres1dent Po!ncare expressed to Count 
Szapary Ms sympathles in regard to the assass~nation In Sara­
Jevo; then he inqulred about Austro-Serh~an relations. In reply 
to the question about what demands would r-e made of Serh i a, Count 
Szapary replied that he was not informed about the Inquiry which 
was still in progress. Count Szapary seems to have just return­
ed to St. Petersburg unexpectedly after hav~ng v's;ted h~s lnval~d 
wife and son in V~ enna. Probably he had had verbal notl ce of 
what Austr~a-Rungary planned to do and had returned to st. Peters­
burg only to play his part In trying to keep the Russian9 and 
thel r French '1'1 sHers from suspectIng Austria's next move in the 
Serbi!1ll 01"1 sl s.4 The interv1 'ew was further described 1n Count 
szap'i!ry's report. So far there was no off< cJ al not! ce g1 ven 1 n 
the Austrian Red Book. 
Yons<eur POincar6 then del<vered a klnd of 
l .ecture, using all h1 s orat.or1 cal powers and 
ex.l)la'.ned that to make a government re spons! ble 
~or a!l1thIng was only admissable when there were 
oo:t1orets proofs against it., otherwi se a demarohe 
1. 	Pa1~01ogue, ~ ~~assador1e Memoirs, I, 14-~. 
2. 	I bid., 1'1. 
3. 	Reports of the conversation may be found l,n Memoirs of 
RaYmond PoJ.ncare, Ir, 1'10-1; Kautsky, Outbreak of the War, 170; 
Austrl.an Red Book, I, 98-9; Paleologue, An Ambassador's Memo! rs,
I, 	17-19.--- ---- -­
4. 	Paleologue, An Ambsssat'.or's Memoirs, I, 18. ~' 
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of th~. s k1 nd would be a mere pretext, and th~ s 

he could not suppo~e Austr1 a-Hungary to be 

gu~lty of, in the case of BUch a small country. 

At any rate one ,must not forgFlt that Serv~ a has 

fr1 ends and that a sttuatton might be created, 

wh1ch mtght become dangerous to peace. Ioonf!ned 

myself to a qui et and precl se answer, remarking 

that up to a certain degree every government 1 s 

responslble for everythlng that happens on !ts 

territory. The president sought to refute th!. s 

thesjs by constltutlng analogous cases between 

•
other stateR, so that I could not but say that· 

all depended upon circumstances and that analogi es 

and generalisations dld not serve. In the course 

of the conversation, Monsleur Po!ncar~ made a 

concealed allusion to the alleged "Prohaska 

case" to which I made a f!.tting reply. 

lie closed the conversat1on by express~ne 

the wl sh that the result s of the ~ nqu~ ry !'light 

be such as not to give cause for ~~squlet. 

Count Szapary felt that M. Spalajkovlc, the Serh1 an Minister, 
might have had somethJ.ng to do w!th the President's wordSj2 
"t /Count Pourtales bali ev~ hat Pre s~ dent Po1nc are's word s were 
"nstlgated by M. Sazo.nov, "who is tr;ring out a pol~cy of hluff".3 
Both A~bassadors considered it very poor taste for the head of 
a state who was v! s~t1ng in a forei gn land to take "9Jl almost 
threatening" attitude. 4 No m~ntlon is made of this in the Br!tlsh 
Documents. 
Because he was pressed for time, Presldent Poincare merely 
shook hands with the rn!nisters of the smaller stateR. He express­
ed a few words of S3mpathy to M. Spalajkov1 c. Then he left, ~th 
/ . 
Y. Ps!eologue, and went to an enterta!nment be1.ng given for the 
off!cers of the French squadron by the St. Petersburg Dema. 5 
On the following day President Po!ncar~ rev!ewed a parade 
of the Russian troops in which IIl.xty thousand men took part.& 
1. Austr1 an Red Book,", 98. 
2. Ibid •• 98:--~ . 
3. Kautsky, Out'breakof the World War, 170. 
4. Austrian Red Book,:r,~. --­
5. Pal~ologue:-~bassador's Memoirs, I, 19-20. 
6. I Md., 23. -­ 15 
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Pre sl. dent Poino are, wM le on hi s Russi an Vi s1 t, h ad the 
objective of using his influence to bring about more friendly 
, 
relations between England and Russ~a, who weTS not then on good 
terms in respeot to the situation in Persia. This had been 
suggested by M. Pal~ologue to Sir George Buchanan, the Brttl.sh 
Ambassador, who reported it to the Brltish Government on July i.1 
President Poincare helped to bring about a better understaflding 
between Russia and England o~ this question, and after he had 
returned to Par! s the British Ambassador there oongratulated h'm 
for Sir Edward Grey on the suooess of his v i sit. 2 In addition 
to the English affair, there was also a misunderstand!ng between 
Russia and Sweden. RUssia felt that Sweden was rearming unjustifl­
ably, and Sweden had grievanoes about Russian esplonage. 3 On his 
return trip President POinoarifl, during his stop at Stockholm, 
carr! ed a reassuring me ssage from the Tsar to the Ki.ng of Sweden. 4 
D'lring President Poincare's visit, a communiqUe was given 
to the press. This was prepared by Ambassador Pal~ologue at the 
order of and approved by Prem; er Viviani. The text follows. 
"The vis1t whioh the President of the Republ'o 
has just paid to H. X. the Emperor of Russi a has gl ven 
the two .friendly and allied governments an opportunity 
of di scovering that they are ; n ent~ re agreementi n 
their views on the various pToblems WhiCh oonOern for 
peaoe and the balanoe of power in ~lrope has laid 
before the Powers, part i oularly j n the East."5 
An agreement reaohed by the Russi an and French Governments was 
reported by Sir Georg-e Buohanan, the Brit~8h Ambassador in st. 
Petersburg, who at a-ted tha.t .Y. Sazonovand Y. PaH!ologue told him 
oonfidentially tbat thq had come to an understanding on the follow­
1. British DooUlllents, n, 39, 61. ~ 
2. Ibi d ., XI, ZOO. 
3. Memoirs of R~mond Poincare, II, 165-6. 
4. ]fciOumentslliI(omati.ques FranjaiB, x, 725. 
5. :pal~ologue, Al1 Ambassador's ~emoirs, 1,25. 
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1ng points: 
1. Pel'feot 00l!l1!!Ul'l1 ty of v1 ews on the var~. ous 

problel!ls with Whi.oh .tb!·Powers are conf.ronted as 

regards the maintenanoe of general peaoe and balance 

of power in Europe, more espeoially in the East. 

2. Decision to take acUon at Vienna with a view 
to thepreventi on of a demand for expl ana tl ons or any 
SUl!ll!lons equ!valent to an Intervention in the i.nternal 
affairs of. Serbia, wM oh the latter would 'h" Just; ned 
~ j n regardi nB as an attaok on he r sovere! gnty and 
independence. 
3. Solemn aff!rrr,at!on of obli~at:lons tl'lposeo by 

the alli ance of the two countrI es . . 

On the 23rd of July, President P01noar~ and Prel!l'er V~vian! 
concluded their Russian visit and embarked on the Franoe, at Cron­
stadt. 2 After Ambassador Pal~ologue had said. farewell to h; s chi efs, 
he returned with the Tsar on the Impertal yaoht to st. Petersburg. 
The Tsar made me sit beMnd h:!m in . the stern 

of the yacht and told me of the conversat1on he had 

just ~ad with Poincare: 

"I'm del:!ghtedv,lth my talk with tb!President. 

We see absolutely eye to eye. ::: am not less peaoe­

loving than he, · and he \8 not less determined thgn I 

to do everythingneoessary to prevent the cause of 

peace be:!ng compromised. He fears sorne Austro­

German manoeuvre agalnst SerbJa ard th:!nks we !'huuld 

reply with the united front of a cornmon d:!.plomatic 

policy. · 1 think the same. We must show ourselves 

firm and united in our efforts to find possible 

solutions and the necessary adjustments. The more 

d; ffl cult the iii tuati on bee omes the more 1 mp.o!'t ant 

will unity and firmness become."3 

While President Po:!ncar~ and Prem:! er Vivian:!. were on their 
return trip aboard the 'France, thei r wi rele 8S reoepti on was 
'" generally bad. 4 As it was proved later, these cO!!ll!lunioat:lons 
had been interfered with by the creation of disturbanclls as 
ordered ~y the German Government. Prem:!er Viviani cited orders 
found in the German w.ireleslI8tation at lIetz t hat French wireless 
1.Br1ti Bh Dooument 8~ XI, 80. ... 
,2. Memoirs of RaYmond Poincare, II, 80. 
3. Pal~ologUe, An Ambassador's Memoirs, I, 27. 
4. Memoi rtl otRs,ymond Po; ncare , 11, 182. 
.. 17 
~rn~unications belng se~t to the France, to Russ! a, gnd to 
Dunkirk were to he d'stl1J:'r~d.l This was ~one of course to pre­
vent act ion by the French Government, who se PreB1 d~nt and Prem! er 
were then on board the France, after the ultima'tum had been given 
to SerM. a by the Austri an Mini ster, Gi e sl, when Prest'dent Po1 nc are 
was 1 eav1.ng RUSSi a' on July 23. 
.. 
On the way to France, the President and the Prem1er made a 
short stop in Stoci:holm where they del 1 vered the Tsar's ~ellsage to 
the K\ng of Sweden and learned of the ultlmatum which had jus t been 
sent to Serbia. 2 As they oont1nued on the 1 r homeward voyage, Presl­
dent Poinc ar~ and Preml er Vivi. ani reoel ved a telegram wri tten on 
July 26 by M. Bienvenu-Martin, the Acting Hinl ster of Forelgn Affairs 
In Paris. Thl.s telegram advlsed the two chiefs of State to come 
home immed.iately in order that they might more easily direct the 
affa! rs of France 1n the interr atl onal or1 s; s. 3 On July 27, Prem1 er 
V1vlani sent a message to the French Ministers at Copenhagen am 
Chr i stianl a telling them to not! fy the rulers of Denmark and Forway 
. ,
that, due to the unsettled fore1gn affalrs, Pres1 dent Poincare and 
M s entourage woul d oancel the'r v1 sl ts 1 n those countri es and 
would return to France l.mmed1ately.4 While stlll aboard the France 
Frem' er V v i an , on July 28, sent wor1!. to X. Bienvenu-l-!artin to 
' ' 
prepare for them on thei r 9I'rival at Dunkirk, on the following day, 
./ 
a dossier about the .lustro-SerMan oonflict. 5 The p~ople were 'glad 
when the i r leaders returned to d i reot thei r cO'llI'try's part In the 
fast movIng diplomatio soene. 
1 . Viv1.an!, As We Site It, 96-'1. 
2. Memoirs orR:f'mOiidPoinoarl!, II, 186. 
3. Documents Dip omatt§ues Fran~a1 .t II, 81. 
4. Ibid., 109. 
5. Ibid., 163. 
18 
.. 

CRAPTER III 
• 
-.THE TILTI YATUY TO SERBI A 
The assassination of the heir-apparent to ihe Austro-Runaer­
ian throne by the young Boen~an. Princip. an Austrian subject, 
was 1nvestlgated by the Austri.an authorit~es. It was proved that 
the · assassins had secured the1r arms from Serb1a, but 1t could not 
be proved that the Serb'on .Governmel".t had had any part 11". the plot. 
In fact, Councillor Wiesner, the Austrian ~nvest~gator, reported 
on Jul!' 13; 
"The complicity of the Serblan Government 8S 

to the assaee:l.nati on and as to preparatton and 

. del~very of weapons, rests on no evi dence, and can­

not even be presumed, n.ay more, there 1 s good reason 

for cons1dering .it ~rnpoea1ble."l 

The assass~nation of the ArGhduke Franc1 s Ferd 1 nand. was not 
the real caUse of the iVorld War; 1 t was the occasi OI'. for the War. 
Pres1dent Polncar~ hae written that 1t was merely the pretext where­
by !I previously planned expedH10n to crush Serr~ Ii 1'11.ght be carr! ed 
out. 2 He cont~nued; 
The CC'unc~l (Austr1an) wrote 1n 1ts m1nutes, 

"CIa! ms so drastl c are likely to preface a refusal 

and w111 allow us to arrive at a fin~ solution 

by means of a mH1.tary ~nterventi on." 

Un the 14th of July, Count BerchtoH., the .Austrt an Mj nister 
for Foreign Affairs, tried at the Crown Council to secure agree­
1. llem01 reof RaYmond POi nOIll'i!. II, 14S. 
2. Ibid •.• 1:m-9. 
3. Ib14 ... 115'7. II> 
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----
ment to the ultimatum wh1ch was to be sent to Serr1 a. Tisza, 
the Rungar1an represertat~ve held out aga1nst h~m tmt!l July 15, 
since he feared that.Huss; a might support Serbi.a and was opposed 
to war because of the r1sk that Hungary would run. Then Count 
Berchtold sent the ultimatu.l'l to Emperor Franc; Bt Joseph for h~ s 
approval. l 
• 
The Austr~ans had planned to send ~he ult~matum to Serb1 a 
before President Po~ncare could leave France for Russ~a. Th~s 
fact ; 8 shown in the report of Al'1bassaoor Tschirschky, t h e Gerrran 
Ambassador at V, enna, on July 13.2 'But Pres1 dent Poincare left 
French soll on July 16, and agreement ab out tbe sencJ 1ng of the 
ult! matum was not secnred unt11 July 15. Rence tM s plan could 
not be followed because the Austr1 ans w{ shed to prevent comlllon 
action by France and Russ1 a to help SerM a. 
On July 14, Count Berchtold reported that the l'1 e lllb ers of the 
Crown Council had agreed that 1t would be best n ot to Aend the 
ult1matum unt1.1 after Pres1dent Po1ncare would have cOlllpleted h! s 
vi s! t !.n Eusei,a. The Austr-i an Forei gn Mi n~ ster felt that ! f the . 
ul t~. matum were sent durl,ng that vj s~ t, France m! ght be " affronted" • 
He wrote: 
.... Overmore, if the amblt10us Pres1dent of 
the Re publ~ c was to di scuss personally t h e new s! tua­
t~on c r eated by the ult~, matum with the Czar, there ~ s 
more probab111ty than otherwise, that France and Russ1 a 
may interfere. 3 
To Count Szogyeny, his AmbassRdor 1n Berl!n, Count Berchtold wrote 
on the following day: 
•••• Bes1des, we should con81de~ } t unwiee 
to undertake t 'he threaten~, JIg step in Belgrade at 
.. 
-1. Memoirs ot R~ond Polncare, II, 161 
2. Kautsky,outnJ of the World War, 101. 
'3. Austrian Red Bock, I .~. 
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the very t! me when the pf'!acelov! ng, reserved Emperor 
R'cholas and unden1ably caut 10uS Herr Sazonow. are 
un(ler the 1.nflue·nce of the Il1'o, who are alwayE' for 
war. I swol'sky an (1. POinoare• 
• 
Ambassador Tsoh~ rsohky reported the same dec i s~. on to hi s Govern­
-
,
. 
ment in Bf'!rlin .. . ~ ." 
•••• For 't was best to av01d 1f poss1ble the 
celebration of a f~etern~zation at Petersburg, under 
the l nfluence of champagne and. of Messrs. Po!.ncar~, • 
lswolski and the Grand Dukes, wh10h might have an 
effect on the assufTJptton 811(1. possl.ole flJst 10n of 
an attitude on the part of both nat1ons.­
In thi s last quot ati on ! s shown the true reason for the 
delay of the ultimatum until after President Poincare's 
departure from Russia - the Austr1ans d~a n ot w~sh to have 
their ultimatum delivered at a time when the heads of the 
states of Franoe and RUSSi a were together and when concerted 
aotion by those two powers was possible, because' such action 
might favor Serbia and hinder Austrla in her plans. Concern1ng 
thi. S Prof. B. E. SchmHt has written that 1t was natural for 
Count Berohtold to delay sending the ul'tlmatum whHe the Tsar 
and hi s state smen were influenced by the two "j ncI ters", P01 n-
car~ and lsvolsky, in order to take the French and Russian Govern­
ment s at a d i .sadvantage, but by such . acti on the Austri an 111 n1 ster 
3
would oertainly "incite" them. 
The Austr! an ofn c1als. after h avi.ng dec10ed to t1.me the 
se1Jdtng of their ultimatum to Serb1a so that !i could not 
possibly oecome known in st. Petersburg until atter Presldent 
I'oinoare's departure, ·had the problem of ascerta1ning the 
exaot time of h1 a departure. The German Govenment through 
1. Auat rian Red 1I00~ I, 49. 
­2. Kautaky, 'Q,it"breu of the World War, 113-4. 
3. Sohm1 tt, Coming ofthe War, I, m. 
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Von Jagow, the Becretary of the Forelgn Office, secured this 

~ nformat1on for,Count Berchtold. l On July 21, ~on Jagow 

received the report ~hat the Presldent's departure from st. 

Petersburg would be at 10:00 P.M., July 23. 2 On July 22, .. 

Count Pourt al~s, the German Ambassac1.or l n St. Peterl"burg, r!'!port­

ed to Von Jagow that 1t would be at eleven o'clock. 3 This report

• 
Von Jagow comrnun1cated to Count Berchtold through Amb~ssador 
Tsch~rschky at Vienna.4 
On rece ~ v1ng tM s news Count Berchtold hurriedly sent a 
message to Baron von Giesl, thf'! Austrian Minister In Belgrade, 
Serb1a, who had the ultimatum which he was t o deliver at the 
previously appointed time, to delay the ult i~atum for an hour. 
This message was sent to Baron von Glesl late on July 23. 
If you can possibly arrange matters, postpone 
the demarche to six o'clock, in whl ch Case the term 
of the answer must also be cha~~ed to s~x. 
I add for your information that we wi Rh, if l.t 
were at all possible, to prevent the news of the de­
marche from reaching Petersburg thi s evening, because 
Pre si dent Poi ncare r e1'lains there unt I l eleven o'clock 
to-night.1> 
CoUIit Berchtold, on that same day, sent Count Szec sen, 
the Austri an Ambassador in Paris, the excuse which was to be 
present~d to the Frel".ch when they woUld not~. ce the coinc1 dence 
of t i me of the two events. 
.As to the coincldenCe of the demarche in Belgracle 
wl th the departure of POi ncare from Petersburg, it is 
to be remarked that we alw!I,Ys meant to take the demarche 
1. Kaut~, Outbreak !!. the -World~, 145. 
2. Ibid., 1:41 . ­
3. Ibid., 153 • 
• • Ibid., 155. 
6 . Austr! an fu!! Book • .1. ll2. 
'. 
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as soon f'. S the i nqu-l ry i!l Saraj evo h!l.d been con­lcluded. T1;I1 s has si nce been the case.
At s ~ x o'clock "in the afternoon of July 23, Baron von 
G~ esl del j vered the ultimatum to the SerM an GoveI'l1ment. 2 Thi s 
document stated t~~t the Austro-Hungar~an GoveI'l1ment con~'dered 
that the Serbian GoveI'l1ment had ' violated ~ts declaration of 1909
• 
to accept Austrian annexa't i on of Bosnia and to be a fr1 endly 
ne1.ghbor to Austria-Hungary. It accused SerM a of having perm~_ tted. 
II. EUbverslve rnove~ent whJ ch had the object of detaching a part of 
the Austro-Hnngarl an terM torl es; the assassl nation l.n Sarajevo 
was cjted as ev~dence. The ultimatum stated that the Austr~ an 
inquiry had proved that the - assasel ·ns had been armed ani' tra'ned 
to use those arms by certain Serb~an officers ·and had been perm'tt­
ed by SerM an front 1. er off1cj als to cross the border' nto Bosn~ a 
and there to kill the Archduke on Austrian terr' tory. An apology 
was d'ctatAd for Serb~a to make. In order that Austria-Hungary 
might be assured afSerbla's inte!ltions, ten demands were made of 
SerMa.3 
The Royal Serbian Government further npdertakes: 
1. To suppre es any pUb1 ' c at ion wM_ch inc1 te s to 
hatred and contempt of the Austro-Rungarlan Monardby 
and the general tendenoy of wh1 ch ~ s d'rected agal net 
!.ts terr'torial -IntegrHy~ 
2 . To di ssolve immediately the soc'-etl" styled 
Narodna Odbrana, to confi scate all 1ts l!Je'ans of 
propaganda • • . .; .' 
3. To ellminate w'.thout delay from public In­
struction in Serbla •.• everything that serves, or 
might serve, to foment the propaganda ag8i~st Austr!a­
1. Austrian Red Book, I. 10". 
2. Documents DipIOiiiitI 9.Ues Fra ga' 8, XI. 2, 4-9 . 
3. Austrian R~ !ook. It 58-63 • 
• 
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H\mgary;
4. To remo'Ve from the l'l111tary serv~ce, sn<l. 

from th e admj n1 strati on t n gemeral, all off~ cers 

and functlonaries gu11ty of propaganda agatnst 

the Austro-Hungarlan Monarohy whose names and 

deeds the Au stro-hungar1an Ronarchy reserves to 

j tself the r~ght of commun~ catIng to th"! RpY,al 

Government; 

5. To accept the collaborat1 0n j n SerM"a of 

representat1ves of the Austro-Hungarl an Gov~rn­

~ment for the suppression of the subvers~ve move­

I'!ent dl rected aga1nst the terri t o~ al 1Yltegr1 ty 

of the Monarcr.y; 

6. To take Judlc1al proceed1ngs aga1nst 

acoessort es to the plot of 28 June who are on 

S'!rb~ an terr'tory; delegates of the Austro-hungar­
1 an Government wHl take part tn the 1nvest1gat10n 

relating thereto; 

7. To proceed ••• to the arrest of Major 

Voya T an)co III ch and of ••. M11an TSi ganov~ ch ••• 

who have been comprom; sed by the result s of the 

magi sterlal inqu~ ry at Saraj evo; 

' 8. To prevent •.• the cooperation of the 

Serbian authorities in the illlC1.t traff1 c in 

arms and explosives across the frontl.er, to dt s­

mlss and pun1 eh severely the.off~c1als on the 

fl'ontler serv1ce ••• gu11ty of having ass' sted 

the perpetrators of the Sarajevo crlme by facil~­

tating thel r passage across the froYlt~ er; 

9. To furn1 sh the I mperi al and Royal Govern­

ment wlth explanations regardIng the unjusttfl.able 

utterances of h1gh Serbian off1c i 81s ••• who have 

not hesl tated since the cr1me of 28 June to express 

themselves in terms of host~lity to the Austro­

Hungarian Government; and, finally, 

10. To not1fy the Imperial and Royal Govern­

ment wIthout delay of the exeoution £1' the measures 

compri sed under the preceding he.ads. . . 

The ultimatum requ~ red a reply in forty-eIght hours, that 1. 8, by 
. 2
slx o'clock on Satul'day evenlng, July 25. 	
.' 
Before the ultimatum had been ser.t AMbaAsador Tsch~ rschky 
had urged moderation on Austrl.a, but hj s actlon was iU spleaslng 
to 	the Kaiser. 3 Fresl.dent Poincare said t.hat in Far1s noth1~g 
1. 	Auetri an Red Book, I, 58-60. 
2 . 	 Ibid., 63::-­
3. 	Memo:! rs OfR~Ond~O~ncare, II, l5l;
or., Kaut'SkY~utbreak .01' the World ~, 6l • 
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was known of these actions being taken !n V1 enna and BerliI!.l 
But Germany knew, on, July 5 when Count Hoyos went to see the 
Kai ser at Potl"dam, that some strong representation would be 
made by Austr:i a-Hungary to SerM a. At th at t1 me the Kai ser 
prom~ R~d to support Austria, even if RUBS! a should enter the _ar. 2 
,
The Kautaky Documents do not mention such a promise. 

After Serbl a had rece;ved the ul tirnatum she appeale" to 

the Great Powers for help and allv; ceo M. Sazonov adv~ sed SerM a 

.to seek Brltish med i at1on3 and not to ente.r hostillties with 
!ustria-Hungary.4 He had the Russ1an Ambassap.o,r at V;enna re­
quest COU11t Eerchtold to g~ve Serb! a more time to answer the 
ultimatum. 5 England made a slmtlar demarche lit VlenJ'la. 6 
The Serb i an reply was deli vered by M.· Pas~.e to Baron von 
Glesl only a few .m;nutes before the exp;ratior of· the time Hmit 
on the 25th of July. The reply was moderate in tone in contrast 
to the Austri an demands. The Serb; ans den! ed havtng fai led to 
observe the de.claration of March 31, 1909. The note took up the 
Austrian demand s one at a ti 1'le •. Some were accept ed, but each 
acceptance was accompani ed by certain reservati ·ons. The f~ fth 
point - aceepttng collaboration of such agent s in suppressing 
the "subversive movement" - was accepted by Serbia only in so far 
as it was compati ble wi th the ' "pri nci pl es of i nt ernat! onal law 
and the frlendly relations of a neighbor state". The s~xth 
1 . 	 Memoirs ot R!lmonll'o1m:ar~.• II. 156, 
2. 	Ibid•• l.!!. . 
3 . Document. D!plolllat1.g.ue. Frangal. s, n, 68. 

, . Kemahs of R ' mond Poin.car' " 11 , 183. 

5. 	DocumenteD! oma ues Franyalll, n, 42. 
6. 	llemairs of aYmond Po!ncar#l, II, 18'1; 

cf., British Documents, XI, 73-4. 
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point of the ultimatum W'1!l rejected - that of partl.o' pation of 
Austro-n\lTIgarians in the in<J.uiry ' .nto the Sarajevo orl.me. SerM a 
stated that if thi s reply were unsatl afactory, Bhe was ready 
to accept "a paclfic unclerstlinding"; and suggested submitting the 
. .. 
entire matter to the Ir.ternational Tribunal at The Hague. The 
Serbians sai d that It would be log; c!ll to entrust the whole effal r 
to the Great Powers who had ha~ a share l.n the Declaration of 1~09.1 
ConceI'1" i ng al\v i ce f or the Serbian reply Professor SChl!litt has 
wrl tten: 
1 f the Belgrade CaM net recel vee. from it s 

European frj.ends spec1 fi cadvice (we have seen 

that the Entente Powers urged moderation and 

conciliation) for the red90tion of lts reply. 

the fact j s not known. The hypothesi B that 

M. Berthelot of the French forel gn office pro­

v i deo. the draft of an anBwer'2while it may be 

correct, has not been proved. 

The Document~ Diplomati ques Fran~ai s 0.0 not menti on any draft 
by M. Berthelot, thereby upholding ProfesBor Schm1tt's statement 
quoted above. 
President Poi.ncare wrote that neither the Ka! ser Tor Ms 
Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg, when they saw the Serbian reply. 
could help thinking that Austria had r~ceived satisfaction.:; :Rut 
Austri a-Hungary was determined to solve the SerMan quesHon at 
that time for her own safety, ar.d Paron von Gleel, her Arnbassa­
dor, left Belgrade 1mmeo.i.ately after glancl.ng through the reply 
,. 
to see that the ultimatum had not been accepted in its entirety 

as stipulated in his l.nstTUctions. 4 Two .hours after answe~. ng 

the ultimatum,Serbia, .knowing that war would follow, ordered 

lIob1li·zati Oll and moved ~er capital to IfV ••5 

1. 	Austrt :8.n Red :Sook,-rl, 160-70. 40-~8. 
2. 	Schmi tt, CO'iiiingof the War, I, 531-2. 
3. 	Memoirs of Raymond POincare, II., 199; 

cf., Kautsky, Outbre/lk of the World War, 2M. 

4. 	Documents Diplomatiques Fran9a1s, n:-&'7. 
5. 	Austrian Red Book, II, 23. 
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On 	 the 29th of July, M. VesnHch, the Serbisn }!~. n~ster, 
ap;?esled to France for help in th~ s cr' s j s, by requesti.ng a 
181'.1 pment of art~ llery, and for ored1.t. 
After Russ'. a had spoken of her sympathy for Serb! a, Austr-! a- -­
Hungary, on July 26, declared to Russl a that she, Austr~ a-Hungary, 
had no intention of sep.k1ng territorial aggrandizement nor of' 
limiting the integri.ty of Serbia. Austr~ a-Hungary wanted merely 
to assu:!"e her own tranqu~llity. It was felt, by the Central 
Powers, that whether or not war could be avoided would depend 
on Russia'sdec'slon. 2 But Austr'a-Hungary planned to d'vlde 
Serbian terrltory among her ne1ghbors when conquered. 3 
By July 28, Austria-Hungary began mobilization agalnst 
Serb:!a and announced in ParIs that she would, on the next day, 
. 4
take energetl c measures to have sat'-sfacti on ~alnst Serb~. a. 
On the 28th of July, Austrl a-Hungary de clared war agal n at 
Serbia. 5 
1. 	Doouments Diplomatl queaP'ran!fala, XI, 205. 
2. 	Documents D~p1olDatJqueS Frania< a, ~, 73; 
of., .Auatri an Red liook. II, ~. II.!.. 53. 
3. 	Kemoira of RaYmond Poinoare. II. 213; 
of " .Auarr1 an Red Book. I II, 54. . . 
',Dooumsnts Dip1omatf'ijUi8 FranlFals. II. 158-9 . 
5, Ibid •• 185.· 
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CHAPTER IV 
-. 
EFFORTS FOR PEACE 
The rapid developments follow1 ng the Austro-Hungar1'an 
~ 
ultimatum to Serb 1 a were lead1 ng Europe toward a general war. 
Germ8J'lY nppe ared ma~ nly 1nt ere st ed 1 n k()'9p~ ng the re st of Europe 
neutral while her ally, Austria-Hungary, settled the quarrel 
with Serbia to her own satisfaction. IllU'lediately after Austrl a-
Hungary had sent the ultimatum to Serbia, Russ~a deolared that 
she would not abandon the Slavs 1n the Balkans.l Thereupon 
Ge r many urged that the confU.ct be "localized", unless the other 
Powers W1 shed to bring about "1.ncalc1,1la'l:>le consequences".2 
But while many events were leading toward a general European 
war, defin1 te efforts were being made to keep peace. Germany 
reall. zed that 1. t woul d be · neoe s8ary to t 'ake acti on at St. Peters­
burg 1 f she w:' shed to prevent' the extensl on of the c'on1l1 at to 
the rest of Europe. For that reason, 'Baron von Schoen, the Germ8J'l 
Ambassador at Paris· suggested on July 26 to M. Bl envenu-Marttn 
that the 1 r two countrl es should seek to pacIfy Russ 1 a 1 f Austr1 a­
Hungary would declare that she favored I'lO annexatl.on of Serbi 8J'l 
territory. M. Bienvenu-Martin, the acting French 1v!1n~ster for 
Foroei61lAffa1rs, sl\~d,that th1 s would 'he pOlIslble only if simHar 
.tepa weros takeJ:l. atV1enna . !'hi s oond~t' on was roefused 'I!y Ambassa­
dor ,,011 Schon. 1I. :B1 ellTenu;';1Iart1n telt that thl s was an effort 
1. Collected D1 pI omat1. c Documents, 269. 
2. Documents Diplomatiques Fran9a1s, n, 19. 
-. 
lto 	sh1ft the bla~e for a conf11ct on to Russ1 a. 
Also on July 26,England proposed a Four-Power Conference 
to be attended by th-e Great Powers not direotly interested in 
the Austro-Serbian affa1 r and its imp11 cati 'ons for , RUS81 a - name­
ly, England,France, Germany, and Italy.2 The Brit~, Bh Ambassador 
in Pari s asked wh ether France would ~ nstruot the Frenoh Amb a '!I sail or 
~ 
1n 	London to represent FrRnce at such a conference; he fUrther 
stated that he :understood that the German Government probably 
3
would accept the suggest10n. The French Government on the 
follow1ng day gave a note to S1r Franc1 s 'Bert1 e, the EngU sh Am­
bassador, a\\thor~zi.ng A!,)bassacl.or Paul Cambon to aot 1n th at cap~,c-
1ty at the proposed conference. 4 
Meanwh;le BerUn failed to accept the British suggesti on by 
the 28t11 of July on wh 1,ch day Austria had CleClded to 1!I0MHze. 5 
On the 29th of July, the Brlt 1 8h Embassy 1n Par1 s ;ssued a note 
reporting that Germany faIled on July 27' to accept the, Br1 t1 8h 
suggestioJ'1 '!)ecau~ suoh a Conference would amount to a "Court 
of Ar'hl tnaM on" which could be calletl only at the request of 
Austr1 a and Russ'l, a. 6 Sir Edward Goschen objected to ,th's 1nter­
pretation of the Conferenoe proposal, but Von Jagow refused to 
change h 1 a op1n10n. Von Jagow also stated that he had Just 
been informed that M. Sazonov end Count Berchtold lntended to 
,.. 
exchant>;e V1 ewe dJ rectly. and that all other med~ a tory influence a 
must awa1 t the outoome of those converaat1 ons. 7 Sl r lI;dward Grey 
1. 	Kautsky,Outbreak of the World War. , 209, 229, 233. 
2. 	British Dooumenta,-n:-To1: -­
ct., Grey, Twenty-five Years, 1. 315. 
a. 	Dooument!! Diplomati1ues Franqa111 , n. 91-2 . 
4. 	Ibid., 135. ' • 
5. 	Ibid., Ui8-9. 
6. 	Ibid •• 236-7. 
7. 	I b1. d ., 230 - 7 • 
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lnext asked Germany to suggest a plan to prevent war.
On the aft~rnoon of the 26th of July, M. Sazonov had an 
intervtew wt th Count Sz~pe:ry in St. Fetersburg, but the latter 
was unwilling to settle th~ con~oversy without first talking 
to Count Berchtold. M. Sazonov tI1 ed to inst1 tute dl rect negotl a-
ti ons w1. th V~ enna, but the Austro-RungaI1 an GoverlU!lent sa1d that 
~ 
1t was tmposs1ble to 0.1 scuse the Serbian reply 	bllcause Vl enna h'lt1 
2
already oeclared that reply to be lnaccepta'Jle. On July 28, 
Ambassador Paleologue secured from M. Sazonov a proml se to accept 
all the peace proposals that would he made by France and England.3 
On July 29, Germany suggested that Austria accept the EngliSh 
sugge stl. on about the "sel zure of host age t err1 tory" - that is, to 
occupy part of Serb'!. a and then to have an arl!l1 stl. ce untll the 
matter could be settled in some peaceful manner. Austr' 'i-HUngary 
delayed giving an answer to this suggestion so long that these 
hoplls were dasheo to Jl~eces by the news of R1l8S~an l'lobi11 zation. 4 
The German proposals for ma~ntain1ng the peace were shown to 
be rsther half-heart lid by a di spat ch sent by Count Sz·ogyeny, the 
Austrl an Ambassador 1n Berlin, on July 2'7, after hi s lntervl ew 
with the Secretary for Foreign Affal.rfl, .Von Jagow , to ·Vienna•.
• 
Count Szogyeny wrote: 
The Secretary of State ~.e.clared to me in 

strict confldence: 

That the German Government had dec 1ded to 

acqua1nt Your Excellency shortly with Eng11sh 

proposals looking toward possi ble oonc111 atton. 

1. D.ocumenta :D1Jilomat1quu Frani.a1 s. XI, .2416 .. 
2 • .AuetrllUl Red'ook, n . 111-'4. 158 -~ : 
Of . , Sritfiii l5OCiiment s • .xI . U3-4. 

:&. Pal flologue, An Amlj!ssador' eRemol rs, I,. 40"l. 

4. 	Ausi;ri8l'l Red""!ook, Ill, 37: 

of., KautBkj":Outbreak of the World 
---
War, 369, 38'7. 
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That the GerMan Government ex:pl~ c~tly assured 
us th 8t H ~ n no way ! dent ~ f1 ed ~ t s"lf wHh the se 
proposals, tha t It was even Qulte opposed to the 
l dea of our c on sid ering the m, and th at ~t waB 
C OM!T1Unlcat~ng t.hem t ,o us simply to comply with 
thelrequest from the En~lleh th Rt we should do 
BO. - , 
The Government of Fr ance, wMle agree i ng to accept the peace 
pllUls propo seCi. by t h e other Powers, h9.d !t s own plan for prevent­
, 
lng a general EUropean war. Thls ~dea, whl ah was energetlcally 
promoted by P r e s ! del'\t }' 04ncar1l, was a plan whereby Germany mi ght 
be caused to keep out of the war - thereby prevent i ng a general 
European Viar. The French urged .the Engl1 sh Government to declare 
that, in the event of a war between F r ance and Germany, England 
WO'l J. C. come to the a l d of t h e Frcl'\ ch. They thought that such a 
deol arati on would prevent Germany f'l'om SUIJport1 ng A'l Atr~ a-Hungary ' 
so strongly and from opposing Russ i a so strenuously.! On July 30, 
Si r Franc ' s Bert~e telegraphed S~r Edward Grey: 
I had aUdi ence of Pre~ident of the Republio 

th i s even 4ng i n order to g~ve h~m your message of 

congratul at.! ons on suoce 88 of hi 8 v! 81 t to st. 

Petersburg, 1'or whioh he wj shes me to thank you • 

. . . . He ! s conv! noed that preservation of 
peaoe betwe en Powers i s j n hand s of Engl and, for 
i f H~ s ~!;aJesty's Governmel"t announce that, 1.n the 
event of oonfliot between Germany and Franoe, result­
Ing from present differenoes between Auetr~a and 
Serv I a, England would come to aid of France, there 
would ~e no war, for Germany would at ol'\ce modify 
her att ' t'lde. 
I explalned to h i m how d~ffi oult ~t would be 
for H~ s MaJesty's Government to make such an announoe­
ment ,3 
On the fo110wit18 day Ambassador Jules Camben at :8er1in reported 
to P rami er Vi vi an!. in Pari ·s : 
1. m"n8ll ~ R2.2!., I I , 126-'. 
2 •. Ush Doouments,- n, 200. 
e L . .. AAX3. 
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.• II n'y a que l'event uali.te de 

l'tnterventton de l'Angleterre qui e!l'leuve 

l'~pereuI' son Gouvernement et tous les 

/ A1nteret s. • 
Ambassador Paul Cal!lbon In London wrot e to Pari. s: 
... .. I note th at durtng the last few dllYs, 

very powerful German lnfluence i s bel ng exerci s~d 

1n Pre s s and in ParI:! ament iby C1. ty men who are of 

German orig i n. Several members of the Cab1net are 

somewh at under this lnfluence, and it is posE:!hle 

that Mr. Asqui th dare not as yet sti.ck hi s feet 

In th~ ground. Personally he 1s all for i nterven­

tion. 

Pre '3';. dent Po)ncar~. in order to press the French pe ace plan 
up'on the Br1.t:!. sh, suggested to the French MIn:!. sters that he shoul~. 
write directly to King George V. Hi 8 su gge stion wa e ap pToven oy 
the French Government. 3 'Ihe letter l'!as c1espatcr:ec1. by spec:! al 
cour!er. In that letter, WTltten on July 31, PreRid~nt POl ncare 
wrote to the English K:!ng: 
Cher :et Grand Ami - The European Si t1.lat:! on is so 

serious that I think jt my duty to convey directly to 

Your Majesty the lnformAtion WhiCh the Fr~nch Govern­

ment has rece i ved from Germany. Her m:!l:!tary prepara­

tions, especially in the ree~ons bordering on our 

frontler, are da1.1y being :Increased anc1. hastened. 

I verily beHeve that the best chMce of pee.ce 
depends on what the British Government says and 
does •.•• I all profoundly conv:!nced that at this 
moment the more England, France a ·nd. Russia give the 
impress:! on of cOfl1plete un1 ty in d1 plomat1 c act:! on. t.he 
more it may be posslble stHl to look for the preserva­
tion of peace. Your Majesty wlll. I trust, graciously 
excuse this :!ntrusion. wh:!. ch :!s prompted only hy the ,. 
earnest desIre to see the balance of lffiropean Powers 
definltely readjusted.4 
To 	 thi s. King George, on August I, repl:!.ed: 
1. 	Doowaent . D1pl olla-t.1 quel!l Fran~a1s. n. 314-'5. 
2. 	){emo1 rl!' of RaYmond Po1ncar~. -Ii. 242-3. 
I. 	Ibid •• 24i. . 
I . 	 Keao1ra or R~mond-.po :! ncare. II. 245-6; 

of.. DooUiDenli · Di plomatl ques Franc a1 s. n, .372-3. 
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It wo'lld he a source of real sat t sfaction 

to me ~ four un!.t ed effort s were to meet w!.th 

sucoess, and 1 fU!l sti ll n ot without hope that 

the terr~ble events whioh seem so near 'may be 

averted. 

• 	 -. 
I am personally using my best endea"-ours w~th 
the ~mperors of Russ 1 a and of Germany towards flnd­
1 ng some $oluti on by Vlh ' ch actual l!l!li tary operati ons 
may at any rate he postPQ1'1efi, and t1me be thuR glven 
for calm dl scussl on between the Powers. 1 i n.tend to • 
prosecute these efforts w!.thout 1nterm< 8fl~on so lone 
as any h ope rel!lsjns of un 8lII 1 cable settlemer.t •.••1 
Si nce H was l.mpossi ble to get s Br1tl sh declaration of poll cy 
at 	tt1 s t 1 me, the French could only hope that war might not come 
and t hat j .f I t d 1 d come Englanii would g!ve m! l ~ t.ary a! d to Frsl'ce. 
I. 	Mem01rs of R~mond 1'0 j noare, 11 , 276: 
ct., Domena Dhlomat1quea fran!jtrl s, n. 4,34, 
.' 
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• CRAnER v 
-. 
MOBILl ZATl ONS AND DECLARATIONS OF WAR 
~ 
The Austro -Hungari an Government, by a decree of July 25, set 
July 28 as 'the date for the beginn! ng of a partl al mobil j zati on­
of eight army corps and two cavalry d1,v.I Bions - against S ~r'!lj a; 
but thl8 lias not a general moMlizat:\.on aBainst other European Power!H. 
On July 27, p'r$,l!l1,er Viv1anl on board the FMU1~" . (lurlng r 1 s 
return triP from Russia, sent instructions to Ambassador Paleologue 
in Russia. 2 In accordance with those instructions, Ambassador 
Paleologue, on July >28, told H. Sazonov that Franc~ weuld carry out 
her obligations as , promised in the Franco-Russ! an Alll.ance.3 eft 
July 29, the Tsar was persuaded by the Russl an mlll.tary leaders to 
agree to a general mobili zation of the ' Ru.ssl an force s, but he c ounter­
manded the order before it could be 1 ssued. These actions ,seem not 
to have been reporie~ by Ambasslldor 'Pal~ologue ~tQ Pari,s. On July 30, 
~he military leaders were successf'Ul in securing the ~sar's approval 
to Russi an '1llool 11 zat10n wh1ch would begin on July 31.4 
On July 30, M. Isvolsky, the Russ1an Ambassador, app,aled to 
Preml er Vivlanj. who was back in Parls by that time, for aid ae 
:promised in the FranCO-Russian AlUanoe and for recogn'tJ.on of . the 
<! 	 • 
1. 	I:aut ~. Outbreak .!!! the World!E, 219, 243. 
2. DOC\1men'h D1 plomat1111!~ran~a1., XI, 118. 
' 3. hid •. • 258. . . 
4. 	l:aut ak7, Outbreat~ t he World War, 403; 

of •• .Brit! 8h DOoUlllente,D, 191-=2. • 

34 
~' 
declarat~on made on July 28 by Ambassaaor Pa1~ologue to M. Sazonov. 
Such a promi se was, Ambassador I svolsky stated, part1 C'ularly wel­
• 1 
come in the present circumstanc~s. In reply to that appeal, 
rremier VivlaTl~. . on Jul;' 3C, sent anote to Russ~a ln whl.ch he sa~d;:'­
that the French Government would r,eglect no opportunity to promote 
peace and would fulfill her all~ anoe obligations, but he urged~ the 
RUBel an Government, whi Ie taJdng prf'C8ut1. onary (I efense measures, 
not to take lmmed' ately any step that might give Germany a pretext 
for mob~1~zation.2 Even on July 31, Prem~er V'v 1 anl stjll seem­
ed to bell eve that Russ~a was only taki.ng steps for pre-moMllza­
tion;3 and ~t was not until j.n the evenjng of the same day that he 
recejved Ambassador Pe.lilologue' e telegram anr.oun ci ne the Ru s91 an 
general mobUization. 4 
Cn July 31, the Kalser wrote to the Auatrjan Emperor that 
he thought that German mobilization would take place on August 2. 5 
Germany, however, hail. to find some way of openJng hostillti.es 
immediately after the begir,n~ng of rnobil~ zatlon. Therefore the 
German Governmer..t iasuecl. an ultimatum to Ruas1 a on July 31 at 
mtdnight stating that If Russi a d'l.d not cease all war measures 
against Austrl a-Hungary and make I!\ declarat~on to that - effect to 
Germany within twelve hours, Germany must mob"lize. 6 On that BaJ1le 
day Tsar Ji'icholas II wired to Kaiser W111~am II that tt was im- /' 
possIble to· stop Russ} an mobilizat~ on whl ch, l.nci.dentally. he 
sal d. had followe~. Austrian mobilization. '7 Russia d 1 d not re­
1. DooumentS DiplomaMquee Fl'a%lgai8. n, 258. 
2. Ibid., 261-2. 
3. Ibid., 336. 
4. Ibid., 356. .. 
-5. Austri!Ul Red Book, III, '75-'7. 
6. Kaut sky', OUtbreak o'f the World War, 404, 429. 
'7. Ib:ld •• 402. - -- -- ­
1 
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fuse the German ' dem'l.nd, but she certalnly (I'd fa~l to accept It. 
Because no rl'lply to the ultlmatum hoo been rece'ved from RUBSl a 
at noon on August I, the Germ8n declaration of war was despatched 
at 12:52 P.M. and was to be deliverf'!d at 6 P.M. 1n Russl a by Count 
'Pourt ale s.l 
Austri a , dec l ded on AUB\let 1 to mobili~e the rest of the army 
and to co ncentrate it in Galtcta, the fl ret day of mo't)il~, zat~, ot1 
2being A'lgust 4. No alluston ",as made to ll'll'led!ate operat~ons 
agai nst Russi a, although ~[ol tke had adv< eed that and r.ad proI!lJ sed 
that Germany would mobilJze. 3 
After war had been declared on Russl a, Alnbassador Jsvolsky 
asked Parls what attitude Franoe would assume in the conflict.4 
In his intervJew with President Pojnca~ Al'lbassador Isvolsky 1'e­
ceived the reply that the French min ' sters would eUl"sly fulfill 
their Alliance obligations, but that a declaratlon of \'Iar would 
require Parl~ amentary appl"oVal. 5 Presi,dent Po', n('ar~ Rai d that 
he hoped to avoid a public debate all the Franco-Russl an All~ ance 
on account of England, and that he preferre1 that war should be 
declared by Germany instead of by France. 6 The m ,nl stry upheld 
th i s statement, but ~,ecidsd to wait for ten dRYS, ln order that 
French military preparati one might be mOTe advanoed and ill order 
to g i ve Germany a chaI"r1e to declare war on Fra!1ce, and thpn to 
call 	a meeting of Farl iament. Thl s was rather d! scouragl ng to 
M. 	 J svolsky. 7 

The German mlli tary plans for war against both Russt a and 

1. 	KautBk1. Outbreak of ~he World War , 432-~. 
2 . 	 Auetrlan Red Book,-rrr:-eO . --­
3. Xaut.U:7. Oiitb~ R1. t he ' World War, 409 • 

•• Memoirs of RaYmonrPolJiCar~. Il-;-!'72. 

5._ IbU. ~!-I'r. 

6. 	Memoirs of R~mond POincare, II, 272; 

cf., Collected DiKlomatic Documents, 293. 

7. 	Memo! rs .Q! Rayman Poi ncar§. II, 2'72. 
France at the same t ~.l!le requ~ red th at a corfl1 ct between Germany 
land :Franoe be started at once.
Germany sent an ultimatum to France at the same t1me as the 
one sent to Russ~a.2 The Ultimatum to FraYlce ~ nformed FraYlce of • 
the demands ~ade of Russi a and a sJt:ed whether FraYlce 'I'Ioul~. rel!la~ n 
•
neutral in a Russo-llerman war. The aYlswer must be gi ven ~ thin 
eighteen hours, wh~ch t'\eaYlt b~r 1 A.M. August. 1. 3 Pre Si i' ent 
I'oincare.- has writtf'n a descr1ption of that ipt~rvif'w of AMbassador 
von Schoen wHh ·Frem; er 171 vi ani •4 
.••• Baron Schoen, like Herr Jagow, sa~ d nothing 
about ~ecilariTl€ war ·on Russia jf she did not demoMlise; 
he only foreshadowed war as a posslbl. l~ty, aYld he 
aaked ViVi an1 whether 1n such an !!Vent FraYlce would 
remain neutral. The qUf'stion had not been unfore­
seen, and Viv~ani and I had agreed that :If it were 
put, it would be w1ser not to say offhand that France 
would do her duty as an Ally. Every moment v.td ch 
did not accentuate international (11 fferences II1j ght 
be a moment g9.~ned - for peace. The Prime Wni. st.er 
sil!lply ejaculated: "Let 1116 hope there will be no 
proceeding to .extremities, and g~ve me time to 
think the thl ng over". Baron Scho en sal d he would 
cOl'le for the answer early the next afternnon; it 
was a thinly ve~led yet qu~te courteous ult1rnatul!l.5 
The German Government had prepared Ambassador von S:(]hoen to 8ftY 
that, in case Frel"ce should prOI!l~ Be to rel'lain neutral, Germany 
demanded that France give up the fortresses of Tou! and Verdun 
as 	a pl edge of neutral~ ty to Germany duri.ng tr.e Russo-German war. 
Baron von Schoen was rell eyed ·that the French refusal to 0.eclare 
her neutralHy made it ur.neceS8'1ry for h~m to make i;he cor,tingert 
demand. 6 
1. 	.Austrian Bed Book, III . 51; 

of •• xautiki.OUtbreak of the World War, 466-7. 

2 . Kaut sky. outb-reak J1t the World War, 432-4. 

:3. Ibi d ., 40(. 

4. 	Memoirs of Raymond POincare, II, 264~5. 
5. 	Ibid., 2~. 
6. 	I bi d., 252. 
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Bethmann Hollweg's tel~gl"am waA, of course, in 
code, and the sec!'et addendum was coil. ell. ~ l' part! cul ar­
ly diff5cult cypher. 
• • • Dur!'ng the War the n l' al secti on of the 
telegram, which had bf'en 1nterce.pted and prese:rved, 
was deciphered, and the secret 1t revealed was sent 
out into the world as ev-i.dence that German::, had i.n­
tended to sacr! fj ce the French people whatev~r they 
d~o. fo):" the maintenance of.peace. l 
~Jrem:ier VIviani replJed that "France would be guided by her 
interests,!2 J'remi er V~vI ani not~ fled the French Ambassador 
~n st. Petersburg, on August I, of Ms ~nterv~ew with Ambassa­
dor von Schoen and sa~ d that he believed that Germany wanted a 
war w~th France. 
~'att~tude d'Allemagne prouve ~u'ell~ veut 
la guerre. Et elle la veut contre la Franoe. 
E~ er, lors~ue M. de Schoen est venu demander au 
~uai d 'Orsay ~uelle atH tude la France compta1t 
prp.ndre ~n oas de confl:! t russo-slleI!lande, l' Ambassa­
dliur d'Allemagne, bien qU'!.! n'y ait d5reotement 
entre la France et l'Allemagne auoun confl~t et ~ue 
nous ~ons employe depu~ s Ie dllbut de la cr~ se et 
emplo"~ons encore tous nos efforts en vue d'une 
solution pac!fl~ue, a ajoute ~u'!l me pria~t de 
pr~senter au Fres~dent de la Republ~que ses hommages
A 
et l:'''' C1erC~ements et demanda~t ~ue 1'01' voulllt b~en 
pr.endre "d~s dl s jiosi tions pour sa llropre personne"; 
nous SBvons egalement ~u'jl a deja. m; s en surete les 
arch'''''es de l'Ambassade. Cette attitude de rupture 
,des relat,i ons dlplomat! ques, Aens confl1 t direct et 
bien qu'une r~ponse n~gative prec~ se ne lui a!.t pas 
ete faite, eet car·acter!stlque de la volont~ a3retee de l'Allemagne de fat re la guerre 8: la France. 
Or. August I, at 3:!i5 F.M. French mobil~ 7.ation WJi8 ordere<1. 4 
A notice of this mobil!.zationwas sent by Premlel:' Vlvlani to Am­
bassador Paul Cambon i n London on the Saple day_. 
Notre d60ret de mob'lisation est do~o une 

lIIesure essentl elle ~ llrese;rvation. Le Gouverne­
1. Wolff ,. The Eve of 1"314, 5'73. 

2.Memoirs or-R~morur inoare, II, 253. 

3.Do"CumentsDiomat tles t FranoaiS, l!, 394. 

4. Ibid., 410. . . 
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ment l' a aooompagn~e d 'une proo1amat1 on, sl..gn~e 

du Pr~sident de 1a Repub11que et de tous 1es 

Ilinisters, et dans 1aque11e i1 exp1ique que 1a 

mobilisation n'est pas la guerre, qu'en l'~tat 

aotuel o'est, pour la France, Ie meilleur moyen 

de sauve.garder la paix et que Ie Gouvernement 

d:e la a'publique multipliera ser efforts pour .
-.faire aboutir les negociations. 
On August I, at 5 P.M., Kaiser WIlliam II, in the presenoe 
of Moltke and Tirpl.tz, s1gned the dooument order1ng lIIobilizatiC1fl. 2 
France made every possible attempt to avo 1.d any incident 
that might cause the beginnings of hosti11t1es with Germany. 
Furthermore Franoe, in order to seoure BrItish aid, IllUst prove 
that she was not the aggressor. Therefore the Frenoh left, in 
the~r own territo:!"y, a neutral zone ten kilometers wlde (althoU8h 
in places less) along the Franco-German front1er. This was done 
to insure that no aot by French troops would preoipl tate war ~.th 
Germany.3 Premier Viviani wrote to the Frenoh am'bassadors: 
• • • • comment Ie Gouvernernent allemand se 

livre oontre 1& France Ii. des actes de guerre sans 

provooation de nctre part ni d&claration de guerre 

prealable de la s1 enne, alors que ncus avons sorupu­

leusement resll ectfli la zone de d1x k110metres que nous 

avons maintenue, m~me de~uis la mobil~sation, entre 

nos troupes et la frontlere. 4 

The people In thi s neutral zone objected to being left open to 
German attack. General Joffre falt that. with "German troops up 
to the ·Frenoh border, oomplete French mor l1izatJ.on was necessary. 
He wrote : 
It 1s vI tally necessary for the Government to 
know that every delay of twenty-four hours 1n oalling 
1. "DooUllents Di~10:tifuea Franttie, XI, 419. 
2 . fautiky, Out re the Wor ''I' 4'~. 
Z••8llioirs ~ Rf.mond""¥.inoar~, n, 42. . 
•t., Dooumen 8 DiIt0mat1Jueo rran'tt.~ II, 412. 
•• Documents D1ploma~ue8rangai8~ , .!I:' • 
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up the Reservlsts and in sendlng the Telegramme de 
Couverture 1011 have for Jts effect a set-baok tn our 
forward concentratIon, that ls to say, an tnitlalloss 
of 15 or 20 kilometres of terrj.tory wl.th eaoh day of 
delay. The Compander-in-Chief oannot accept this 
responsi bil ity. 
EVen after it had been strategioally neoessary to abandon, on 
~ 
August 2, the praotloe of leavi~ a ten kilometer zone, which 
had been deolared on July 30, undefended by Frenoh troops, the' 
French army was still ordered to create no inc1dents of war. 
In view of these systematto 1noursions General 
Joffre now asked us to oanoel the order as to the 10 
kilometre line. The Government waited a few hours 
before agreeing, and it was not until the afternoon 
that the restrtotions were oancelled and oomplete 
l1berty as to movements of troops was accorded to the 
Commander-in-Chief. Even then the Gen eral, in issuing 
hls orders that evening to the Army Commanders, added 
that for reasons alike national and diplomatic, it was 
imperative to leave to Germany the entire responsibility 
for hostilities. • ••2 
Thus 1 s shown the fact that France was determined not to be res})on­
sIble for the war, that the deolaration of war was a stsp that must 
be taken by Germany - and not France. Prestdent Poincare stated: 
•••• it would be better for Germany to 

deolare war on us than for us to declare war on 

Germany.3 

France did not want to deolare war because tt mjght lose for her 
the atd of England, and it followed that.it was up to Germany to 
recall her ambassador fj rst. 
German troops invaded French territory several times before 
a state of war existed between those two countries. SOIne of 
these invasions may have been accidental, but others proved 
1. .smoi r8 of RaZllon4 POincare, II, 2~5. 
2. Ibid.. 2'1!'. . 
3. Ksmoirs of Ra;vmopj l',~nqari, n, 272. 
40 
~ 
to hsve been ordered by German officers. 
Une patrouille allemande a penetre en terrltoire 

fran\la~ s a J oneherey. L' offl.cl er qui 1 a comm!ll'ldai t a 

brUle la cervelle !I. un soldat franQal s et a i!te tue 

par les camarades de.celui-ci. 

Une patrou~lle foulllant les VOl s a prif deux 

uhlansy'ui vl.ennent d'Stre amenes g Belfort. 

In hi s Memoirs President Pol.ncare wrote: ~ 
•.•• On the 3rd three German mounted men were 

caught at COincourt, Rech~court and Remereville, and 

on one of them, an off1cer, was found a patrol order 

wh1ch told him to go as far as st.N~cholas du Port. 

On the same day, before the declaration o~ war, an 

aeroplane threw slx bombs over Luneville. 

On the thl rd of August, Ambassador von Schoen handed to 
Premi er Vi vi ani the German de cl arati on of war. 
Les autorit~s administratlves et miHtaires 
allem!ll'ldes ont consta~ un certa~n nombre d'actes 
d'hostilite c.aracterl.s6s commis sur territoire 
allem!ll'ld par des aviateurs militaires franpal s. 
Plusieurs de ces derniers ont manlfestement ,jol~ 
la neutrali t~ de la Belgique BUl?'olant Ie territoire 
de ce pays. L'un a essay~ de detruire des constructions 
pr~s de Wesel, d'autres ,ont ete aper~us sur la reglon 
de l'Eiffel, un autre a jete des bomtles BUr Ie chemin 
de fer pr~s de Karlsruhe et de Nuremberg. 
ie BUis charg~ et j'ai l'honneur de faire 

connaitre a V. Exc. qu'en presence de ces agressions, 

l'Empire allemand se consid~re en etat de guerre 

avec la France du fait de cette derniere Puissance. 

Ma Ml ssion diplomati que ayant ainsi pr1 s fin, 

il ne me reste plus qu'a prier V. Exc. de voulo1r 

Men me munJr de mes passeports et de prendre les 

meBUres qu'Elle jugeraH utiles pour assurer mon 

retour en Allemange avec Ie personnel de l'ambassade 
 /'
a 1nsi qu'avec Ie personnel de la 16gatiol' d~ Baviere 

et de consulat general d'Allemagne a Parls. 

The German excuse for declaring war on Franoe was the alleged 
violation by France of German territory. Germany claimed that 
French av1 ators had thro1fll b ombs near Nuremberg, but there was 
1. l)ocument s D1 plomat"ques Franeaia.XI, 48'7. 
2. Memoirs of ~Hmond FOinoare,lI, 28'7-288. 
3. Documents- nil!omatiques Franqais. XI. ~09-510. 
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no proof that the aeroplanes were etther ~ilitary or French 
nor that any bo~bs had been thrown. The other Ger~an story was 
about an aeroplane raid over Wesel in which the aviator had been 
brought down, but no corpse was ever found. But Ambassador von 
Schoen d1d not mention these fantastic stor1es sent to him by 
: /
Foreign Secretary von Jagow. Concerning this Fresident Foinc~e 
wrote: 
••••Why on earth did not the Ambassador make 
use of this information in his letter? Dld he suspect 
its fantastic character? He has explaned in hi s Memoirs 
that the telegram wasso l1le81 ble that it could not be 
entirely deciphered, Fd this explanation has glven rlse 
to many suppositions. 
French sentiment was now unified against Germany. Even some 
of the royalist leaders wanted to fight for France against Germany. 
Among them were the Duo le Guise, Frince Roland of Bonaparte, and 
the Duc de Vend6me. Fresident Foincar~ wrote that he would have 
been willing to accede to these requests but that the Cabinet thought 
it impossible without public discussion, which mIght be injurious 
to French national unity.2 Concerning thess royalist requests 
President Foincar~ stated • 
• • •. • these letters only go to prove that any 
French dissensions 1Ihich existed yesterday have been 
altogether sponged away today; it is indeed a unified 
people which stands up under the Tricolgur flag to 
speak effectively with a hulking enemy. 
Fresident Foincare sent, on August 4, to the Houses of Farliament 
his message, requested by the Cabinet and delivered by Fremier 
Viviani, and it was approved and applauded by the Senators. 
1. .~ulol re oj Rymon! l'o~ ncar', II , 28.,. 
2. I-bU._. 2B. 
3 .• Ib14. ., 296 . _ . 
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• France had Just been the object of 
violent and p:!"emed1 t ate,1 attack. wh1 oh ~.s an 
insolent d~fianoe of the laws of nations. Be­
fore any deolaration of war had bean sent to 
us, even before the German ambassador had a~k­
ed for hi s passports, our terr~tory had been 
vi olated. l 
-. 
Franoe was at war with Germany. but Germany had not yet in­
vaded Belgium. however she had 1.nvaded Luxem't>urg on August 2.2
• 
Th1 s England tr1 ed to prevent. Upon heaM.ng of German mobi11 za­
tiol".. England took identical steps at Pari s and at Berlin. On 
July 31, the Eng].' sh Government asked whether the Frenoh and 
German Governments would "undertake to respect the neutrality 
of Belgium", so long as no other Power violated it.3 The French 
Governl'lent replied in the afflrmat1ve;4 but thll G-erman Govern­
ment madl'! no direct reply, feeling that H m<ght disclose their 
plan of cam:>:!!1gn.5 The BMM eh Min~ eter ~n Brussels asked whether 
the Belgian Government would do everything in its power to mainta1.n 
jts neutrality: a statement whioh led Belgium to look forward to 
BrHish intervent10n 1f her neutral1.ty were v1.01ated. Belgium 
replied that she would defend her own terr1tory.6 
The German war plans. whi ch had: been made far i n a~.vance, 
called for war on both the western deastern fron1s. These 
plans, for a quick and decis1.ve blow against Fra nce and then a 
war against Russia, had first been made by General Count Schlie­
./ 
ffen, who was on the general staff, in 1894. TM s plan had been 
definitely accepted by . German m11itary leaders from 1912 on. 
1. 	Sohmitt; Comine .Q! the War, II" Z"S-9; 
of. ,lIelioirs of RqmOiil PciInoare , n . 296. 
2 • .Dooum'ents D1Pfomat1H'e. Fr8llisisa.n, 442. 
3. 	Brithb. Document. ,218, 33. . 
4. 	British Doouments, Xl, 234; . 
of., Doouments D!ploIDat1res Frani'ais, Xl, 380. 
5. 	Bri ttSh Do ouments, Xl, 2 4. 
6. 	fiiId-;-;-240, 286. 
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Therefore, 1 twas neoessary to begin military operatl.ons against 
France at the same tIme as those aga~nst Russia. l In order to 
begin operations against France i t was nec·essary for German troops 
to oro ss throU8h Bel~ um . . The Belgian Government reali zed H s 
possible danger from a German attaok and took steps to try to assure 
her safety. On the 31st of July, Y. KlobukowSki. the Frenoh Yinister 
~ 
in Brussels, wrote to Premier Vi~. ani saying that the BelgIan Govern­
ment had aSked whether France would respect the neutraU ty of 
Belgi= and that he had repHed that France would do so.2 Such 
. 	 ~ 3 
as.uranoe was confirmed on August 1 by the French ~overnment. 
France offered atd to Belgium when her forces would be ready and 
Belg1= rp.pll ed with thanks but dit1. not then appeal to the Powers. 4 
On August I, Germany de11vered her ultimatum tc Belgium. 
This note said that Germany had learned that France was going to 
advance through Belgian territory aga!nst Germany. Germany, there­
fore, must advance through Belgium, and she promIsed, <f Belg<um 
would remain neutral and permit this, to guarantee Belgian r1ghts 
and independenoe atter the war and to pay Belg' um f or any damage 
done. If Belgium resisted, she would be treated as an enel'lY; a 
reply .a. demanded within twelve hours. On August 3, Belgium 
asserted her neutrality anel satd that she would use all her power 
to repel the passage of German troops.5 
./ 
On the 2nd of August, t he German arm e s i nvailed Luxemburg. 6 
.King Albert of Bel~. =, on August 3, asked King George for 
1. 	Austrian Red Book, Ill, 'Ill; ' , 

of., KautBii,-:oitllrel!ik fit the World War, 330-1. 

2. 	Documents DhlomatiQues"r'iiiiah, 1I:-!77. 
&. 	ieme1rs of R lion Po!noai"e, II, 263; 

ef., DooUiiients D1 lOll1ati Uee Fran~aie, D, 380, 417-8. 

4. 	Memoirs of Raymond Poinoare, II, 82. 
5. 	Austrian Red Book, lII, 104-'5; , 

of., British Documents, n, 301-2; 

of., Kaut Sky , Outbre8lC of theY/orld War, 330-1.511.553-~,585. 

6. 	Documents Diplomatiques Franlais, n. 442 • .., 
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"diplomatio intervention"; S~r Edward Grey, on the s ame day , 
promised int ervention if Belgian neutrality were violated. l 
On the 4th of August, Belgium, too, was invaded by the German 
-.2 arm~ es on t he'r w~ to f i ght aga1n~ Franoe. Warfare on the 
western front had begun. 
From the moment that Franoe began to feel the probabi 11t,t 
of a general European war 1 n whi ch France would take part, French 
diplomacy was directed toward learnJng whether she could count upon 
Engl i sh support. On July 30, Ambassador Paul Cambon r eminded 5~ r 
Edward Grey of the agreement of 1912 ,3 that England bad und er­
taken to Join with France i f the peace .of Europe we"'e t hreatened. 
Th l e threat, said the French, now ezi eted because Germany was 
beginning her military preparations. At that time the Bri tish 
Foreign Offloe was unable to make a statement, due to Cabinet 
di ssensJ.on. On the next d~, suoh an aTiswer was made by the Brl ti sh 
Ambassador in Paris. 
The letter of President Po :tnoarl to K1.ngGeorge V wae pol~te­
ly received on July 31, but the King's reply stated that "England 
could not yet ~ake a stand. 4 
On July 31, PremierV1viani received the following despatch 

from Ambassador Paul Cambon in London : 

L'Ambaseadeur d'Allemagne ayant demand~ 

ce matin Ii 51r E. Grey s11'Angleterre obeerver­

ait la l1eutrali te dans Ie conflH qui semble 

i mmj nent, 5i r E. Grey a · repondu "que l'Angleterre 

1 . 	 EM tie Doouaent., n. 809. 
2 . 	 Br1ihi DooUlllenjf' Xl. 3U: 

of •• DOCUlllent.plo.at1g,ue.Franea1s~ 11, 5041. 

3 . 	 See abon, Pace i . . 
4. 	Doewaents D1plolla«g,ues Pranea1 s. II, 3'12.-3, 434 • . 
'" 
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ne ~ourrait pas rester neutre dans un conflit 

g~neral et que, si 1& Francl1 ~ etfH 1mpllquee

l'Angleterre y sera!t entra,nee." 

Franoe notlf1ed ~England of the German ultimatum and the 
levering of dilllomat!c relstions between Franoe and Germany. 
Ambassador Cambon told Sir Edward Grey that France was e~Gsed 
to attacks on land and on eea, the latter beoause, in agreement
• 
with England, Franoe h!li concentrated her !laval forces in the 
MedHerranean Sea. BUt the reply made was that the J3riti Bh Govern­
ment, since publlc opinion was not yet orystallized, could not 
2
make a defin! te st atement to France. 
On August 1, Sir Edward Grey informed Ambassador Cambon that 
Frll.l'lce had a chll.l'loe to promise Germany to remain neutral, and 
t}lat therefore the s i tuation was different from the Morocco inci­
dents. lience England need not aes1.st Franoe, but this di d not 
mell.l'l an absolute refusal by England to gi ve any assi stance what­
ever to FranGe. Englll.l'ld had at that t!.l!!e decided agail"st sel"d:tng 
an expedHionary military foroe to the oontinent. But a change of 
attitude was llossible. 3 ­
On the morning of Auguet 2, the situation was still doubtfUl 
and the British Cabinet refused to eanetion intervention." In 
the afternoon S1r Edward Grey made the following promise of oondl­
t10nal support to Ambassador Paul Cambon: 
1 am author! sed to glove the' assurance that, 1 f 
the German Fleet oomes into the Channel or thr01l8h 
the North Sea t<J unde-rtake hoetlle operati on s againet 
Frenoh oo-asts orllhipping. the British Fleet will 
give all t .lle proteotion in it. pow-er. This assuranoe 
1-	 Docnuaenh Di 10111&1;1 1lIlS F~anUh. XI. 36&. 
2. 	lemoirs of ond · G1nearfl. II, 268;
of., Britr . DocUllentj, ,2~3. 
3. 	n ___ !wenty-f1ve Years,ll, 41-2; 
British Documents, XI, 2~3, 260. 
4. 	~•••• sh Documents, XI, 274-5, 278. 
~ 
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is, of course, BubJ ect to the pol~ cy of the Govern­

ment rece1v1ng the support of Parliament, and muet 

not be taken as MnMng the Government to take any 

&otJ.on untH th~ above contingenoy of action by the 

German Fleet takes plaoe. l 

But the Cabinet was unable -to promIse to intervene if Franoe were .. 
attacked by Germany; that deolsion was for Parliament to make. 
On the mornIng of August 3, · news of the German ultimatum to
• 
Belglum reached London. The Cabinet then decided to mobilize. 
Sir Edward Grey told Parliament that England would stand behind 
France and Belgium, and M s speech was appla_Uded. 2 
On August 4, Sir Edward Goschen, the Brit~eh Ambassador, called 
upon Von Jagow. He stated that the -entry of German troops into 
Belg! um had dec~ ded the Britt ell Government to demand a satj sfactory 
reply by mldnJ_ght, or ellle England would do everytMnj(poBsible to 
guarantee Belgian neutrality which had been guaranteed in the treaty 
to which both nations had agreed. SInce no promise was forthcoming 
from Germany, Sjr Edward Goechen demanded h~e passports when the 
:3time limit was up. On August 4, Ambassador Paul Cambon reported 
from London: 
Le Gouvernement br~ tannl que n' a reQu aucune 

reponee de Berlin au euJet de la neutra1it~ belge, 

mais 11 a apprie de souroe tndir('tcte, et le rlmse!:g:ne­

ment a ~te conflrm~ par l'ambassade d 1 Allemagne ! 

Londres. que Sir ~d. Goechen avait re~ ses passe­

ports ce BOlr. En con s~quence. l'Amlrautt! a 

prevenu les escadres anglal ses *ue la guerre 

comrnenyait ce eoir ~ 11 heures. 

And so France was noll to have the aid of England 1 n her war agal net 
Germil.ny. The war which was to last for more than four years had 
begun f -or France, E!!81and, Belgium, Russia, Germany, andlustria­
RUIl&ary, and H was then in full bla. t. 
• • 
• /1> " 
1. Cambridge R1sto~ of Britt ah F orel gn PoB 01, III, tIOl. 
2. KautSky, Outbre Of the World War, 5'4. 

:3. Bri ti sh Document s, Xl, 314. 351. 
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CHAPTER VI 
• 
RESPONSIIlILI TY OF POINCARf AS VIEWED BY HI STORr CAL 

WRITERS AND RESEARCH SCHOLARS 

, 
In thi s study of the role played by President Poincar~ in 
the negot1. ati ons between June 28 and August 4, 1914, it is now 
possihIe to arri ve at something approachine; a defirli ti ve con­
clusion regarding responsibility. But first it ; s appropriate 
to consider the judgments of some of the most authoritative writers 
who deal wi th the subJ ect. 
Since the outbreak ot the war, and more parti cularly sInce 
the peace treaty was made, many persons have given long and hard 
study to the doaumentary material appearing from various govern­
ment arcbives to determine the degree of guilt or responB1b1ll.ty 
of thiS, that or the other government for having brought about the 
War in 1914. Article 231 of the Versailles tr~aty, the so-called 
"war gui.l t" clause, may be sai.d to have set off the po st.-war cam­
paign to discover the truth. Whi le German soholars have been es­
peei ally act1.ve in thi s work, naturally, in order to clear thei r 
own country of the blame, eminent scholars of many nations have ,.. 
contributed their bit to our knowledge of tod~. Some of the 
writers quoted below arB Amerioan historians, for example, Professors 
Schmitt and Fay, who haTe made painstaking stud1 es ot the oauses 
ot the World War. haTin& begun the.ir wo!l: snn durin, the c!)nfl1et. 
)(• .Renourtn cd If. Bloch are well-boft !'renck hi .storianson the 
• 
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subJ eot. There are also some former ofn c1 al s, pol1 tl oal 
opponents of President Po~noar6, and others. Eaoh author has 
formed ' a definHe opinion about the respons1 MlHy of Pre sHent 
Poinoar/!. 
Stdney Bradshaw Fay, Professor of Htstor,y at Harvard, in 
~his Origins ~ ~ World War, 1930, has made soms pertinent 
remarks. 
'. • • . At fl rst, dUM ng ths War, wr~ te!'s s O1l8ht 
to fix the "gutl t" for havl ng caused thi s unparalleled 
"oril!le" upon a few single !ndlv1.duals - oMefly the 
Kaiser, the Pan-German~. sts, and the Austrian and German 
mil~tarists. Then, with the publioat~. on of !'lore complete 
doouments whioh began in 1919, it was seen that the 
Entente thesl s of the sole respons~ M.ll ty of Gerl!lany 
and her allies was no longer tenable, and writers who 
del!landed a "revislon" of the Treaty of Versaliles tend­
ed to go to the other extreme of fixing the "guilt" upon 
Entente leaders -- MY. Izvolski, Poinoar6, Sazonov, and 
even upon 8ir Edward Grey. Finally, with the growlng 
realization that all the Powers were more or less respons­
ible, and with the ino!'eased attention whlch cam~ to be g~ven 
to the underlyin! oauses of the War, more jud1 c 1.oualy and 
hi stor! oally minded persons were less inolined to aooept 
the easy solution of expla1n!n! the War on the soape­
goat or personal devil theory - that 1. S, of the "gu~. lt" 
of this or that individual. They fell baok on :the truer 
explanation that the War Was caused by the system of interna­
tional anarohy involved in alliances, armaments, and 
seoret diplomacy But, after all, the "s'ystem" was work­
ed by individuals; their personal acts built tt up, and 
oaused it to explode in 1914. In the di souse1 on of the 
future, it will be the work of the h!storian to explain 
the politioal, eoonomio, and psyoholog1oal motives which 
oaused these 1.ndividuals to act ~s they did. lie will 
also cease to talk about "war guil tit; sinoe no person 
in authority was guilty of deliberately workin! to 
bring about a general European War. But he will still 
oontinue to d1 souss the "responsibi11 ty" which eaoh 
statesman must bear for !lote which . ultimately contri­
buted to the catastrophe.~ 
He hae given the following olinioD of President Poincar~'e writ­
' .DgB about the war in the period fro• . 1926-1931 • 
1 • .,~, · Origine of the World War, !93()., I, 2-3. 
-. 
, 
.., t9 
• • • • To be sure, M. Poinc ar~, in the fourth 

volume of his memoirs, has made a skilful and 

elaborate plea, to prove "La France innocente". 

But he is not convincing. It is quite clear that 

on hi s vi si t to' Russ 1.a he assured the Tsar's Govern­

ment that Franoe would support her as an ally 1.1'1 

;•.preventing Austria from humiliatiD8 or crusMng 
Serbia •••• Presl.dent polncar~, upon ·his return 
to Franae, made efforts for peace, but hIS great pre­
oooupation was to minimize French and Russian prepara- ' 
tory measures and emphasize thosfl of Germany, in ,
order to secure the oert ainty of Brl t1 eh 8Upp0rt 1.1'1 
a struggle which he now regarded as inevttable. 
Concerning President. Poincare's orltics and his repons~. bility 
for the war, .IIr. Fay has written i n 1930: 
M. Poipoar~'s most severe oritios have been 

M s own oountrymen - Pevet, Judet. Fabre-Luce, 

Converset, Morhart, Viotor Margueri tte, Lazare, 

and a host of lesser Hghts. They have charged 

Mm ~.th getting rid of cautious ambassadors like 

M. Georges Louis in st. Petersburg and M. Crozier 

in V1.enna to make way for a ohauvinIst like M. 

Delcass~ or puppets like E. Paleologue and .II. 

Dumaine, in order that he ml~t be more free to 

work with Izvolski in bringing about a war which 

should reoover Alsace-Lorraine for France an~ 

secure ConstantInople and the Straits for RUBsia. 

Many of hIS replies to ~helr oriticisms are sound. 

He manages to explain away Aome of the incr1minat~D8 

'remarks that Izvoll3ki attr1butes · to him. But 

in many other case s he seems to take refuge in the 

praotice of throwing dust 1n the reader's eye by 

(Hvert1ng attention frOI!l the main point to minor 

matters • 

• • • • He believed a European war "inevit­

able"; in tighteniD8 the Entente and in making 

promises to Russia he did in fact tend to make 

1 t inevItable. Herein 11 e s hi s re spon s1 b11i ty.2 

Herman Lutz, the Offioial Historian of the Bavarian Parlia­
mentary Comml.ttee on War Responsibility in 1925, in hI s Lord 
Grey and t!lLWorld !!!:, .. :1>92.8, has written: 
• • • Cert ai nly the bl'oad "SS8.11 of the 

French people ·were anxioull f er pe.~e and had no 

1. Fay. Originll or- th, Yor14 1£. 19~. t II. M~-6. 
2. Ibid.•• I, !4-!7 
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desire for a war for rev8lIche; but not so a number 
of the prominent persons in power. Among the latter 
first place belO!!8s to Deloass!!, PoInoar€~ and Pal'i!o­
logue. They an~ tho Be who thought 11'1 th them naturally 
too~ oare not to give publio expression to their 
secret desires, hopes, ' .and aims. Po~. noarfi also :.. 
adm~tted . that there was no direct way out; for 
this reason he f'ed the Russo-French All:l.anoe "on 
the Austro-Rus s1 an rivulry in the Balkans", f':I.x­
ing hls gaze always on "the hole i n the Vosges". 
•
•••• For no less a person tha~ Polncar~ 

hJmself bore witness af·ter the war that 

"Dur1ng my school years my spIrit, 
oppressed by the defeat, unoeasingly
crossed the f'rontier which the Treaty 
of' Frankfurt had imposed on us, and 
when I climbed down from my oastles in 
the air I saw no reason for en stenoe for 
my generation but the hope of recovering
the lost provinoes,-l 
He has stated that President Poinoare's vislt to Russia, al­
though his conversations there ramal.n unkno~.servell to incite 
Russi 'a to be !i rill with Austrla-Hungary.2 But I have f'ound no 
dooumentary evidence of this contention. 
Alf'red Fabre-Luoe, a former French diplomat who was one of 
President Poinoar~'s countrymen an~ pol~tioally hostile to the 
President and whoa the latter aocused of f'alsifioation and mis­
representation of doouments and statements, voiced his opinions 
in The Limitations £! V1otory, in 1926. 
Yost of those who returned :po1noar6 to power
'believed that the antagonism between German Imperial­

ism and France's resentment must inevitably be fought 

out some day. They thought it neoessary to make 

open preparations for the sanguinary etl"1l8gle by 

strengthenir~ tteir armaments and alliancee. They 

. ,ere of opinion that stro!!8 p.ol1o'y might. in a fell' 

years, oreate the oond1tions neoessary to ensure a 

Franah vi otory, and, as it had to be f'8ced, they 

1. LutE, Lora ~ and ~ World !!£, 188-9. 
2. I bid. ,"'!Ji-~ • 
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hoped that the confli ct might take place at a 

favourable moment. ~~en!h! da: ~, they 

thought less of ,taking advantage of i? fhOd­
will or hesi tation shown :!lz. Germany, -1l ~ 

Interest of peace than of over-throwinf her 
 ; .the momentehe maAe a in~stake. Nor did hey 

forget that-rhe day on whicn war broke out 

would also be the awaited day of revanche. 

fhey assocl ated plans of conquest with France's 

,defensive poliOY, whioh were k~pt dark until 

hostilities were opened, but were then reckon­

ed amongst the objects of the war.l 

It may be that the above o:ptnion is b1 ased by the author's 
:pol i ti cu! di slikes; Concem1ng Presl dent Po~ ncar~ and Ambassador 
I evol sky he wrote: 
..•• Ievolsky's reports were :published ln 

MOSCOW, and they attributed incautious remarks to 

Poincar~; but Tsari st Russl a had :pen shed and 

Isvolsky was no more. By sacrificing the dead it 

was still possible to save the French Government: 

Poincare no longer tri'ed to prove the .joint innocence 

of the AIHgs, a& before but blamed the Russi an 

ambassador. 

Be said about President Poincare's trip to Russta: 
There was, consequently, no po s sI. bl e doubt as 
to Polncarels att1tude tn Petersburg between the 20th 
and 23rd of July. WHhout havtng tl:le least idea 
of the nature of the Austrian demands, or of Germany's 
intentions, he took up a position of firm opposltion 
to wh'oh he gave a defin l te character, and from which 
he did not, as a matter of fact, recede in the 8l1.8ht­
est degree to the end. SUoh a polley assumes that the 
adversary's will is a b11nd force, incapable of chang­
l.ng or den ating from 1 ts course, and thus i! oes away 
with all ternptation to develop a pacifl c tendency. 
From that time onwards, tr.ere was very little chance <' " 
of averting the war, and, moreover, Poincar~ had left 
Russl a carte blanche to let it 100 se whenever she 
liked,selling that two days after his departure 
Pall!ologue, aotiIl8 on his instruotions, iPromised · 
SazonoT unconditionally that, from the moment the 
Aunrl'an ultimatum was deli Tered, France ",%uld tulfill 
all t)J.e obl1gationsof her all1ano.e •••• 
1. Fabre-Luoe, fhe L1mttations of ·Tietory. 119. 
2. Ibi d., 23. ­
3. Ibid., 182-3. 
.. 
~2 
'I'M s oonCllus~ on 1 s not borne out by the ~, ocuments ava11ahle. 
Er1 ch Brandenburg, the German hi st~rian who has taught at 
Heidelberg a1'Id Leipzig, in his book From B1 smarok to the World 
.~ --­
War, 1927, has sai d that President Poinoare and I evol sky worked 
- '. 
:to brine about the war. He has used almost ent'rely German 
sources and seems not .to have been fam11tar with ' the works of 
Professors Schmitt, Fay and Renouvin, and he could not have hatt 
any acqua1ntance with Pres1dent Po~nc&re's own account, wh1ch was 
published in the following year. 
Wi th Franoe and Russ~, a the case was qui te 

different, I 60 not doubt that the great body 

of the people even in these two co~tr'es were 

desirous of peace. In the rultng Circles, both 

1n Paris end St.Petersburg, there were two parties; 

the one wanted peace jf it could be mainta'.ned con­
. sistently with honour, the other wanted war. In 

Franoe the latter oombined wl.th ,those who cherish­

ed the idea of revanohe, wMoh had never ·die!\ out. 

Poirio~re and Deloas86 were its great protagonlsts. 

S~ noe the brush ' wHh Germany in },Iorocco and the 

founding of the Entente, th1,s party had greatly 

strengthened its tnfluenoe; and f1 nally, with 

Poincare as leader it had as~med the ' real ma1'lage­

ment of affairs. In Russi a the: Czar was the head 

of' the peace party; for ,8 long time tn,e war party 

was wHhout any real leader. ,Wide military c1roles 

and all those who favoured Pan-Slav ideas Elupport­

ed the war party at St.Petersburg. In Iswolski, 

after his personal reverse in the Bo'gn).an orJ s1 s, 

they found a zealous ohampion. As Ambassador in 

Pari s ,thi s vain and, vengeful lIIan fell wholl;Y 

~der the sway of the Delcasse and P01n08Te group 

and rendered ' it the greatest service bf his person­

al influence. Hts despatches from Par~ s, the pubU­
cat i on of whi ch in a German t ranal at1 on ha snow 
,,­been completed, show olearl;y to anyone who is not 

blinded by prejudice, b;y what oautious and subtle 

methods Iswolski, in conjunction wlth POinoaTe, 

prepared for the war. He knew how to get rid of 

refractor;y elements like Georges LOUie, the Fr~noh 

j,lIIbaseador in St. Petersburg, ho. to bribe the 

pre ss and make US8 of j. t. and lao. to exploit the 

i n.aUable TWtZ ot Poinoare . I t 11 -reaU.z 

tUtttCftllt to •." * 1oh ot tl1e t., led and whiah 

toliowed. there i . BO doubt a .. to the~r oloae 

oo-o)leratlon. ....01*1 carmot rep-eat too otten 

what 800d luok i t is that POinoarli, and Jlot 
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some other less reliable !lJ1d less skilful polltici an, 

stands at the head of France. l 

This viewpoint s .eems to me to have a purely nationalist prejudic .. , 
since the author has' failed to consult all the documentary material 
avaHable. 
In The International AYla1'chy, 1926, G. Lowes DI ck1nson, an 
Engli sh author, has said that A...bassaodr I svolsky was particul\rly 
elated by M. POInCare'S elevation to the PreSidency, and that he 
wrote to Russ1 a how fortunate such an event was for RussI a and told 
on . what friendly terms he was wlth the new PresIdent. Yr. Dl.ckinson 
has quoted two remar):., that were attrIbuted to Presj deYit Poincare 
early in 1914, by Y. Judet, a Frenchl!lan whose personal and polItIcal
. 
dislike for President Foincare ar'e shown in hj s writ1,ngs F.J1d who was 
bani shed from France for a nUJllber of years. 
"In two year'S the war will take place ·. ,All 

my efforts will be devoted to preparing for jt." 

"Whatever be the issue, small or great, 

which may ari se in the future between Russia and 

Germany, i t w~ll not pass by lIke the last. It 

will be war." 

."Pierre Bemus, the foreign editor of the Journal des Debats 
,and ' correspondent of the Journal de Geneve, in his art1 cle on 
President Poinoar6 in the Encyolopaed1a Brjtannlca, has said: 
• • • • In power, he endeavoured to cement 

the frt endsM,ps and strengthen the alll ances of 

France. At a later stage, hiS enemies at home 

and abroad crjt~c1sed him severely for his 

po11cy; yet it is hardly ' reasonable because a 

man IS sufficlently far-seej,ng to appr€'heYld a 

storm and make preparat10n for It, to accuse 

hIm of wishing to hasten it. He claimed that 

he iUd his utmost to avert war, holding that 

the w8,J to prevent the oonflictwas for those 

powers &t!ainst who. the \IIenaoe .all directed to 

prellent a powertDl aDd united tront, thus mak­

ins At imprUdent t o .tte~tanl aot of aggress­

iOll . 
... 
1. Brandenbur8, From Bismarck to the World War, 1520. 
2. Diokinson, The:Internationar-Anarchi, 34S:­
3. Eno,yclopaedIaBr1. tannlca, iVIII, 11 . 
-
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Cam! lIe Blooh, the Frenoh hl stortan and professor at the 
Sorbonne who is the director of the Bibl!oth~que de Dooumenta­
'tion Internationale Contemporai.ne · et lfus'e de la Grande Guerre 
..
and who helped edit the Documents Diplomatiques Fran~ais, has 
stated his opinions and oonolusion on the question in his book, 
~ Causes of the World War, whioh was published in 1935. He • 
first states the question: 
The question must ari se as to whether any ohange 

of atti tude oocurred at the time of the vl sl t to st. 

Petersburg and whether the Frenoh statesmen oan be 

aooused of urglD8 a P.lore aggressi ve attt tude upon 

their Russian oolleagues, in an evem' more preoarious 

European situatl.on. Did Pres1 dent Potnoare, as has 

been alleged, "strE!l),gtbm the hands" of the partl sans 

of strong aotion on the part of Russia agalnst 

Austria? Was there then (as has been believed) 

some kind of agreemant between the leaders of French 

and Russian polioy, of whioh Pal6ologue. the Frenoh 

ambassador, Ias aware and -the import of Whioh he 

exaggerated? 

Y. Blooh has been unable to find any evidenoe that Presl-dent 
Poincare influenoed Russia toward war. 
We now oome to the dooument whioh bound the 
two governments,namely the communiquG2 in whioh 
the conversations of the previous days were offioially 
summed up, and of whioh a preliminary draft had been 
made by Pal6ologue. I~ affir~ed the "perfeot oon­
oordance n of "views" of the two Gove.rnments and their 
"intentions 'for the maintenanoe of European equilibrium, 
especially in the Balkan peninsula" •. 
When it was submitted to the French visl.tors, 

this draft struok them as oomro1 tting Franoe too far 

"i.n following Russi an polt cy j n 1he Balkans". They 

therefore modified it in aocordance with the desire, 

expressly enunciated by PoIncare and Viviani, to 

"leave the future unmortgaged", to "under,line our 

pacific intentions". and to "further safeguard our 

liberty of action" - 'phrases which were the very 

oppOSite of any encour.agement to war.. The final 

Tenion of the ·oo.muni!lUe 'thus arriTed at simply 

af~1 raed the two Government s' ·oo.ple~. eommun'ty· 

• 
1. Bloch, The Causes of the World War., 110. 
2. See abOve', page 10. -- ­
5~ 
.. 
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of"views about the various problems wM,ch regard 
for gene'ral peace and Jl:urop ean equili br~ urn crl!ate for 
the Powers, espec~allJ' in the East". There 1s to be 
found in it no ~nd~cation of that "anything but oalm­
ing" influence wh~ch the Austro-Hungarian ambassador 
attr:l buted in advance to the Pres1 dent of the French 
Republ~c, at a moment when he was already '!IWare of 
the text of hl B own Government's Ultimatum to Serbla. 
The communiqUe reveals no more than an effort to pre­
'vent IUBB~ a alone undertakIng any l!alkan adventur!!, 
or rashly involving her ally.l , 
In 1912, President POincare, during his v~, sit to Russl a, had 
learned the true nature of the Balkan pacts whi ch appeared to be 
offensIve as well as defensive, a fact whi ell differed from the 
reports by Russia. 2 Therefore the French Government wanted to 
insure itself aga~nst beil'1g carelessly drawn into a war. 
M. Bloch has given Ms conclusion in Ms "General ~mary", 
part xn: 
In the conversation mich had taken place a 
few days earlier in St. Petersburg between Poincar.e 
(the French President), V! vl,an;, (the Premier), 
N~cholas II and Sazonov, it is imposs~ble to find 
any proof that the French statesmen urgecl. the Russians 
to decl are war.:3 
M. Bloch has carefully used the documents al'1Q wr:ltings concern'ng 
the World War origins from the various countries involved. 
Theodoi' Wolff, the editor of the BerHner Tagblatt during 
the World War and up until the advel'1t of the Nazi regi me, has 
g< ven 80me argument 8 favorable to President POinoare 1.n h; 8 book 
./ 
wr~tten in 1936, The Eve of 1914. 
Frenoh wrl ters have contended that at bottom 

Poincar~ was impressionable and weak. They have 

painted him as a conqueror quIte without resolution 

of character, looking hesitantl, OD all aideB be­

fore every decl, eion • • • • How did thi s man of 

1. BIOCh'.1'l'lfu ,.oitM World War, 114-5. .­
2. Kemoirs 0 aymon~o!ncar~, I, 213-5. 
3. Bloch, The Causes of the World War, 188. 
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hesitations succeed in treaning such lofty and 

dangerous paths? •••• 

But t'here . must be eomB explan ati 011 of the 

fact if a man "Who neither sh1nes amid -the oommon 

greyness through his personality, nor is able to 

win heartl! through tke warmth of his own, appears 

again and again to a great numberof hi s compatr1 ot s 

to "Ie the obvious, almost the Ir;Mspensable manager 

of their affairs •••• In a book called Les Princes 

Lorrains Albert 'I'h1baudet 'lias indl cated the bond that 

•un!. ted the Frenah people, or at all event s the French 
bourge01sie, with Polncar~. This exoeptionally 

Industrious worker, thi s watchful off1 c1 al, •• • 

this lawyer crammed with knowledge of the codes ••• 
was, in a country whl ch sl noe the great Revoblt10n 
•.• had seen the expounders of the law at jts head, 

••• a ~epresentat1ve of the general average of its 

ojtizens •••• The sober-minded and economIcal 

French father of a family recognized Poinoarl'l as 

more closely akin to hl mself, and ••• he believed 

that he found l.n Poincare the re11 abilJty for 

whioh ••• he was fundamentally concerned. l 

• 
• • • • People s~ "in oase of eme~genoy" 

when they no not want to pa~tIcularize any 

definite emergency. So It oertainly was with 

PoIncare. A man of h1 a type doea not del~herate­

ly want and work for wa·r, but may oontir..ually 

dwell on the idea of the inevitaMljty of a war 

untH at 1 aet he fi rrnly b e11 eve s in 1. t and then, 

In order not to fajl through Inadequate prepaJ"a­

t 10ns ohooses a path "in oase of emergenoy" which 

even I'll thout an emergenoy 1s full of (langer. It 

seems to me that Alfred Fabre-Luee is much too 

oonfident in M a assumption of a definite purpose 

in the PO.incare of 1912 when he wrItes: "Ill every 

j.nternati onal i sINe Foinc are. we1.ghs h1 s ahances. 

If he meets with adverse willde, he waits for a' 

better opportun1ty". Poin care, however, thought 

that war could no more be prevented than a volcan~. c 

/eruption. And ae the eoothsayers were so sure of 

their message they took no thought for means of 

cooling men's hot head"but prepared opinion "in 

case of emergenoy~2 

1. Wolff, 'l'hl! EYe of 1914, 116-'. 
2. Ibid., m.--­
.. 
 ~'7 
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• • 
Pre s~ dent Poincare travelled a ereat dl'al 
about the oountry • • • • The wor!! "peace" was 
to be found <n everyone of h1 s speeches; but 
alwa.Ys ·he unfurled the flag of a "great and 
strong" France and let 1 t be understood that 
he, or France, would n ot shrlnk in emergency 
from a dec1 s~ on by arms. He spoke as Tht ere 
had spoken in 1840 again st the too pacifi c 
Guizot: "S1 la France recule, elle descend 
de sa rangn ~"If France Shrinks back ehe 
loses her proud place."l 
• • • .1 t has been stated that he sajd 
tn DuIlkerque that "1 t woul d be a mt sfortune 
if war were avoided, for we shall never again 
be able to wage war under such favourable 
circumstanoes as now". He denies having made 
any statement of the sort, and at hi swish 
eye-wi tnesses have attested th'S fact and 
diSposed of the maltoious fable.l~ 
IT' General Joffre's Mel!loi rs there 1 s a 
report of discussions at the beg1nn i ng of 
1912. The French General Staff had received 
news once more of the intended German l n­
vasion of Belgium, and Joffre spoke at 
l~ngth on the question whether the French 
army should march into Belgium n at the 
very beginning of the operati on", l.n order 
to forestall tae enemy. He himself, Mille­
' rand, the Minister of War, and Delcasse, 
M~ ni st er of the Navy, were in favor of 
forestalling, but Poj.nca!'e, thePrime Mtn­
i ater, disagreed. The French entry into 
Belglum, he said, must at least have the 
justifioation of an actually imminent 
German invasion. 3 
• 
... 
1, Wolff ,'.rhe be of 1914, 283. 
r.r-r--"­2 ·. Ibid., 00•• 
3. Ibid., 627. 
• 
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George Peabody Gooch, the Brit1 sh histortan, has given 
the following op'n:l.on of Presl dent Potncare in hi s History of 
Kodern Europe, 1922• 
• • . • the ele'otion of Poincare as Presiilent 
in January proclalmed the new spirit of confldence. 
The atmoepheri. c change was recorded and analysed 
in a series of dispatohes from the Belgian Minister 
in Pari s. ".. • • To say that the French nati on • 
has become belUoose would be going too far •••• 
. The men at the head of affairs are sincerely pacif'e, 
but their action is excesslve. It is good to restore 
to a nation 1 ts dignity, but I!angerous to foster its 
ohauvinism. ~hey began by military parades and 
marchlll§ through Paris •••• It must have pleased 
Poinoare, the Lorrainer, on the f1rst day of hie 
off:! Oe to affirm hi s resolve to hold the flag erect. 
In these troubled moments there is the danger of 
his presence at the ilysee. One hopes hls cool and 
practi.o.al mlnd 1'1111 save him from all exaggeration."l 
The main cause of the oonfliot lay in the Near 
East, and its authors were Germany and Austria on 
the one side, Russi a and Serbia on the other • ; • 
But for a qUarter of a century the destinies of 
FrlUloe hal! been linked with those of Russl a, and, 
when the long-expeoted cr1 si s .arrived, she took ' 
her place at the Side crt her partner with as lHtle 
hesitation as Germany at the side of Austri a. She 
had no desire for war, and took no step to precl pltate 
it. But she had never abandoned the hope of reOOTAr­
ing the Rhine provinces, and for .that reason could not 
be Inoluded among the "satiated Powers" who are the 
most eff,ective ohampions of peaoe. The oatastrophe 
long feared by Jaures, Who was assassinated by a 
Nationalist on the eve of war, had oome to pass 
and Franoe was :dragged into a desperate confliot by 
the ambltions of her ally. To have decllned the 
summons would have constituted disloyalty to her 

treaty obligations, lncreased the contp.~pt for a 

"decadent Power" Whi ch w.as entertalned beyond the 

Rhine, and have left her defenceless against the 

victorious Teuton. 

Pierre Renouvin, the Boted Frenoh historian on the causes 
of the World War, has wr1tten in his Immediate Qr',g1 ns of the War, 
1. Goooh, 'Rist 017 of Jlodem Europe, 515. 
2 . Ibid., &51. -. 
59 
.., 
--
in 1928: 
•.•. Of course, after U. Po'. l"car~' s v' S1 t to 
st. Petersburg, and after the reassuring st ateroent s 
made by Y. Pal'llologue, Russ~ a knew that France would 
live up to "the obligations of the alliance". An~, 
aooording to the reports from her Amb&ssador in L~ndon, 
regarding '!he personal sympatb! es of SI r Edward Grey, 
she knew that she m1ght also count on a frjendly atti­
tude on the part of England. It is entirely possible, 
and even quIte likely, that this knowledge .about the 
,
other members of the Entente served as a k1nd of en­
oouragement at St .Petersburg. Ne' ther Fran ae nor 
England had ral. sed any funil.amental objeattCl! to the 
idea of RussIan parttal mobil~zatton. But d~d that 
mean that she was LOW free to proaeed to ~ore ~xtp.ns1ve 
measures? The EngH sh Amb assao.or had advl se(1 Sazonov 
to avo,d going as far as general mobilization, and 
the ,t'renah Ambassador expressed the desl re of the 
Parjs Cabinet, on the thirtieth, that Russia Should 
guard against takIng any measure wM ch roi ght furn l sh 
the pretext for a reply on Germany's part. Sir Edward 
Grey and lI. Vl viani thus aertainly did not want 
Russian general mobilization.l 
Bernadotte E. Schmitt, the eminent Ameri aan h1storl an, has 
expressed the following opinion aoncerning the respons1b l l1ty 
of President PoInoarl, in his .Comlng of the War, 1930: 
•••• If a defini te judgment of Frenah :poliay 
must be reserved until the publiaation of the French 
doauments ts aompleted, there is at present but little 
evidence to support the view th&t the Frenah statesmen 
were seeking a favorable opportunity f')r reve.i;ahe. 
On the other hand, the evidence 1 eaves no doubt 
that Frenon opinIon and French statesmen were ready 
to accept war if the necessi ty were presented. "Franae 
does not desire war, but 1 s not afraid ot it," sa1d 
M. Poincare in a speeah at Nanes late 1n 1912: and 
h's words were reported by the German ambassanor 
in Paris as an aaaurate retleation of the French 
temper. "France", he remarked to M. Izvolaki, "is ' 
lnaontestably disposed to peaae, and neither seeks 
nor desires war; but the interventi.on of Germany 
against Russia would immediately modify tM s state 
of mind"; &nd he was c(}nv1.naed that "parliament 
&nd public opinion would, in such case, entl rely 
approve the decision o~ t he ,g,overnment t o lend arm­
ed support to Rueai a.­
". 
1. Renounn, Immediate Origins ot the War, 342. 
2. Schmitt, Coming of the War, ~ 66: --­
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In 	the report of the proceedings of the Ameri can H-I stor'­
oal Assoc~ at1.on Conv~nti on of Decf'lmber, 1938, there are a few 
paragraphs about the d:l soussion of l'ro-tessoTs Schm! tt and Fa:y. 
"
.
. 
That the question of the or~gi. ns of the 

World War still holds the interest of many 

Arner~can historians seemed to he 'nd1cated by 

the very large attenda~ce at the session at 

•whi ch S1.dney B. Fay and Bernadotte E. SchmHt 

dj scussed '1 ts present status. Both BIle'akers 

declared in the main that they stood by the 

essential findings as presented in their 

respect~. ve publ i shed works on the ori.gins of 

the war. • • • Mr. Fa:y turned to the present 

status of the "war guilt" question in different 

countries •••• the speaker indj cated SOMe 

of the changes he would now make j n rev!. sing 

M.s Origins of the World War. In particular, 

he would give more attent~o"£ to econom1c and 

psychological causes•••• 

This printed report does not mention any reVision of Mr. Fay's 
conclusions concerning Pres' dent Poj. ncar~, but r.e -I s reported, 
on 	good authority, as saying on that occasion that he now 
recognizes that he was too severe in his Judgment of M. Poin­
care when wrHing his book and that, in preparing a re~sion, 
he 	expects to deal more leni ently with M. Poincare's acts. 2 
It 	is certain that his revi sed opinion is in some considerable 
degree the result o-t his examination of .the documentary publ~­
cation of the French Government, the appearance of wh-lch was 
held to be the chief basis for the present revi.ew of the eVi-
./ 
,. . 
dence on M. Poincare's role in th.e pre-war negot -I ati ons. 
In his se.rie. of volumes entitled Au Service de la France, 
whi oh waa trll1lelat ed as the Kemoi rs .2!. Raymond Poincare, Presi­
1. 	Re.po rt arnit1ed WHi8ttlry ,and Hi.t or'-ans at Chi eat;o" , i n 
.lmer~e 8J1 H\ st or~. o. Review, LXIV, (April, 1939), 490-1. 
2. 	Reported \i Protessor A. D. Beeler, April 28, 1939. 
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dent Poinoare has given hiS version ot the oontroversy. Conoern­
ing th~.s serles of books, Mr. Wolff hae WTHten: 
• • • • W"e have the pioture ot a man who has 

wr1tten down, pressrved, and set ln order h 1 a Whole 

record, the great events and with no less oare the 
 :little ones, and who's able to say at any moment: 
"Here in tront ot you 1 s the whole story ot my Hte 
and my aotions; my doouments are 1n perfeot order:" 
~ and oonstantly he br1ngs forward M.s ev:I.denoe trom 
his .doouments. A Frenoh politIoian who has had • 
glimpses into the pr1vate life ot the great has told 
me that every ni ght before going to sleep Po~ noare 
oonscientiously wrote up hi s diary •.•• But more 
preci ous to hi m than ruM es is hi s metloulously De at 
reoord when he is defending himself against hi s ad­
versaries and critios. One oan feel at every stage 
hiS sense ot triumph when, thanks to thi s perfeotion 
of organization, he is in a posHion to produoe evi de£oe 
in blaok and white to bring an opponent to oonfusion. 
President Poinoare has stated that the Triple Entente diplomats 
tried in every possible way to prevent the War, whereas the 
Central Powers did not know how or would not do so .2 He has ably 
deal t with an aoousatIon that he failed to follow up a oerta1 n 
propo sal that might have prevented or ret arded the war by quot­
ing a letter of M. Berthelot to the effeot that Frenoh politi oians 
did everything possible tn 1914 to avert war.:3 Fresl dent Poinoare 
has written, oonoerning ,Ambassador I svolsky' s insinuati.ons: 
Ot oourse.in Paris, aooording to Isvolsky, 

there was. a ohiet ot state,putted up with 

vani ty and for whom the witne ss ot the Russian 

Amb assador was suffi.oient to determi ne hi stor­

ians to agree with hi m as to thei r judgment. 

But anyhow thi s megalomaniao presIdent could 

do nothing hy himself; he had no right either 

to sign a deci sion without the countersign ot 

a lili.hister,or in any way to put himself in 

the place ot the responsible Government, or 

to .ay~ will proo1 aim a 'state ot siege' 

:o.r I. will JUt my ad:nrsaries in pri son". 

1. Woltt, 'l'he Eve of 1914, 115. 
2. Kellloirs? l!iYmont Poinoare, 11, 206-'7.· 
3. Ibid., 259-61. 
'. 
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And. his M~n l. sters were men of peace, quite aware 

of thei.r respons i M.llt i es, and quI te able to restraIn 

or repudiate hIm j f he stepped out of h~ s own part. l 

Coneemin& bi. retUl"ll to France at·ter h-. Journey to Russia, 
: ' P res1 dent Fo!ncar~ has stat ed: 
A little after 8 A.M. on the 29th we dlsembark­
ed at Dunldrk, and among those assembled to greet us 
there are a few who say, "~hy did you not come • 
back sooner now that Europe :I. s so anxious and France 
in possIble danger?" One of my lntervlewers went 
a 11. ttle fll:rther In t elHng me, "We have had enough 
of this! It's the same thing over and over aga~n! ' 
It would be hetter to fin~ sh with it once and for 
all". To Mm I can only reply, "For the love of 2heaven .don't talk so; we must strive to avert war.­
He has sai d that he was e spec i ally careful to be neutral j n hl s 
conduct during the prewar negot l ations. 
lry positi on as Presl dent was Just now 1 n 

many respects painfully passlve; I presided over 

Cabinet Councils, I oonferred with the Y~ nisters 

who came to see me and read all the telegrams 

and reports whI ch they brought. Rut intensely 

loyal as all the !!~n i sters were In letting me 

know everything that WBS going on, I felt that 

they were oonsti tuti on ally re"!!ponsi ble and that 

full freedom of aotion must be left to them. 

Thi s only made me a prey to every emotion, and 

through the long hours of tho se long days I was 

constantly having to hold myself In tIghtly, lest 

I should do anythIng to add to the troubles of 

others, while over and over aga!n I asked myself 

If Europe were really goIng to be pluneed Into 

a bloody w",r Just because Austria was bent on 

noIsily rattling Germany's sword. 3 

" 
1 ••emo1r8 ' of 1l!;lIllOl'Jd·Poincarfl, Il, 291. 
2. Ibid., 214. 
s. Ibid., 24:2. ,. 
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CHAPTER VII 
co.WCLUSI 0.1'1' 
Before stating my oonclusion about the respons'lbillty of ~ 
Presl dent Poincarll during the d.ays immedi ately preceeding the 
outbreak of the World War, it is first necessary to def1ne my 
interpretation of the meaning of the word "respons1b l llty". 
The terI!l "respor..sibility" may be vi ewed, in t .hi s case, either 
as a conscious attempt to bring about a World War, or as a 
responslbil1 ty fo!" acts which, .nile not premeditated ir, order 
to lncite war, may have been links i n 'the ohain of events whIch 
led toward that war. In respect to t'he former l. nterpretatton, 
the documents and wri t i ngs ·wh1.ch I have consul t .ed or.. thI s sub­
Ject have not, in my opinion, given oonclusive evidence that 
PresJ.dent Potncare actually plotted to ~ ncite a war ae;ainst the 
Central Powers. As for the latter 'Interpretation of the word 
"responsl.bi lity", it s eems to me, there may be found consider­
able room for difference of opinion. 
President Poincar~ believed that some day there would be a 
war between France and Germany. ~e could foresee th i s as the ,.' 
result of the various alliances, ententes, and " i nc5dente" that 
had occurred since 1871. He dtd not intend that France should 
be cauaht tla,l)ping llBaini he did intend that Franoe should be 
thorouahly prepared, bJ means of the three-year ati l 1tary serrioe 
law and her Allianoe p d Ent ent e , 'for nGh a ool!f11ot. 'I'he· 
wisdoll of such a course was shown in the outcome of the World 
War. 
-

On hl strip t n Russi a, Presld.ent Pol ncare felt t.hat 1 twas 
n,ecessary to reaff! rl!l the solidar! t~ of the Franao~Russi an All!­
anos - wM,ch had been made by Fresident Carnot and Alexander III. 
But suoh .. routine :J'eatt1 r m.ation wh~ ch , in the communique~ ,spoke ; 
of a hope for pe ."ae in Europe was not nace ssari1y an act to 1nc1 te 
Russia toward war. It was a step taken in the dlreation of ke~ping 
peace in Europe. However, evell a sel!m1ngly !.rmocuous statement may 
have been 1nterllreted as a prom1. se, a carte ' blanche. Russ1 a, Since 
the Russo-Japanese War o'f 1904-1905 when France (Ud not support her 
ally, (although the Alliance did not call for a 1d in such an eventu­
ality), was not ent're1y sure of her ally. In 1905 it seemed poss­
i ble t hat the Tsar mi ght be won over to the s1.de of Ger!!!an~. There­
fore, 1t WaS more necessary than usu~ for the French Go~ernment to 
reaffirm adherence to the lIro:'!1sions of the All!.ance. ~nch Atate­
ments may h ave been cons i dered by Russian Jingoists as prorn!ses 
' of aid in any eventuality. There1 n l!.es a oertain degree of respon­
si bil!.ty. 
After he had returTled to France, F-resident POi n care support­
ed every attempt made to avert war between Austria-Hungary and 
SerbI a. He saw to it that advice was sent to Russla to avoid, if 
possible, g;ving GeTl!lany an excuse for declaI"!.ng war. France tr1 en 
to avoi d breaking off relations w1th Germany. But even ;f France 
/ 
had prom'sed to remain neutral in the event of a Rus~o-German War, 
there was the contingent pro»ositi~n td the German ultimatum 
whicih would have been prollosed next. Certainly no sovereign state 
. 0rt117 ot the nallls could haTS givslIl up two v!Uuabl:e :rortresses 
OD d!!'aand. :ror occuliatioD by another Powsr as * gBl:s o:rits neutral­
,. 
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ity. SUoh a propos~tIon Was ~rnposs1ble, and It was so intended 
- by ita authors. The German ultImatum could not have been accepted 
in all ita part . b7 11 FrllDce wh1.ch expected to remain Boveretgn in 
her own t erritory. 
Presi.dent Poincare pll\Yed hi s part in such a way as to gIve 
110 offense to England In order to reta1 n for Frar.ce Brl tl.sh ai"a 
in a possIble war. He accepted the Frl.t~sh proposals for evert­
1 ng war. He asked for a Br1 ti sh <l.eclaration of future aid to 
Franoe in the event of a Franco.-German war because he 1:> p~ 1eved 
that such a declaration would d~ssuade Germany from entering the 
War. SUch a result was of course problematical. Fra~nce, after 
concentrating her fleet in the Y.ed1 terrane an Sea, as pro vi ded 1 n 
her 1912 agreement, ask·ed for protection by the English fleet 
along her vulnerable Atlantl c Ocean-North Sea coast11ne. Thi s, 
too, seems only a natural request. France oertair.ly tr~ ed to 
get England on her slde, not 88a1.nst her. 
President Poincare beli eved in preparedness I\nd worked to­
ward that end, but some of his actions toward that end may have 
unconsciously led toward the beginning of the World War. Hts 
respol'lsibil1 ty was, in my ollinion, not a premedItated scheming 
to bring about a ge~eral European war. His responsibility was 
/'the responsIbility of any government head who believed in the 

theory that in order to have peaoe it was neoessary to prepare 

for war and also in the dootrine of the inevitahHity of war. 

,. 
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